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ABSTRACT:
Science studies has shown us why science and technology cannot always solve technical
problems in the public domain.  In particular, the speed of political decision-making is faster
than the speed of scientific consensus formation.  A predominant motif over recent years
has been the need to extend the domain of technical decision-making beyond the technically
qualified elite so as to enhance political legitimacy.  We argue, however, that the `Problem of
Legitimacy' has been replaced the `Problem of Extension.'  This is a tendency to dissolve the
boundary between experts and the public so that there are no longer any grounds for
limiting the indefinite extension of technical decision-making rights.  We argue that a Third
Wave of science studies -- Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) -- is needed to solve
the Problem of Extension.  SEE will include a normative theory of expertise and will
disentangle expertise from political rights in technical decision-making.
The theory builds categories of expertise starting with the key distinction between
interactive expertise and contributory expertise.  A new categorisation of types of science is
also needed.  We illustrate the potential of the approach by re-examining existing case
studies including Wynne's study of Cumbrian sheep farmers.  Sometimes the new theory
argues for more public involvement, sometimes for less.  An Appendix describes existing
contributions to the problem of technical decision-making in the public domain.
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lay'man one of the laity; a non-professional person; someone who is not an expert.1
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF EXTENSION
Technical decision-making in the public domain is where the pigeons of much recent social
science are coming home to roost.  The problem can be stated quite simply: Should the
political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain be maximised by referring
them to the widest democratic processes or should such decisions be based on the best
expert advice?  The first choice risks technological paralysis, the second choice invites
popular opposition
By technical decision-making we mean decision-making at those points where science and
technology intersect with the political domain because the issues are of visible relevance to
the public: should you eat British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired power stations,
want a quarry in your village, accept the safety of Anti-Misting Kerosene as an airplane fuel,
vote for politicians who believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto agreement, and so
forth.  These are areas where both the public and the scientific and technical community
have contributions to make to what might once have been thought to be purely technical
issues.
Like many others, what we want to do is consider how to make good decisions in the
right way.  But our particular concern is to find a rationale which is not inconsistent with the
last three decades of work in science studies.  Our initial claim is that though many others
working within the science studies tradition have studied the problem, and contributed
valuably to the debate about technical decision-making, they have not solved it in a way that
is completely intellectually satisfying.  For us to claim to have solved anything would be to
give a hostage to fortune, but we think we can indicate, firstly, the reasons why there may be
grounds for both academic and political discomfort and, secondly, a direction in which the
work might go.
This paper is not about social relations between scientists and society.  For example,
it is not about whether scientists are trustworthy, or whether they behave in a way that
4inspires trust in the public, or whether the institutions through which their advice and
influence is mediated inspire trust.  At least, in so far as the paper is about these things, it is
only indirectly about them.  What it is about is the reason for using the advice of scientists
and technologists in virtue of the things they do as scientists and technologists rather than as
individuals or as members of certain institutions.  In other words, it is about the value of
scientists' and technologists' knowledge and experience as compared with others' knowledge
and experience.  The dominant and fruitful trend of science studies research in the last
decades has been to replace epistemological questions with social questions but we return to
a rather old-fashioned approach, asking about the grounds of knowledge.  What is different
here, as compared with the debates about the grounds of knowledge that took place before
the `sociological turn' in science studies, is that we try to shift the focus of the epistemology-
like discussion from truth to expertise and experience.  We think we need to start pursuing
`SEE' -- Studies of Expertise and Experience.
One of the most important contributions of sociology of scientific knowledge has
been to make it much harder to make the claim: `Trust scientists because they have special
access to the truth.'  Our question is: `If it no longer clear that scientists and technologists
have special access to the truth, why should their advice be specially valued?'  This, we think,
is the pressing intellectual problem of the age.2  Since our answer turns on expertise instead
of truth we will have to treat expertise in the same way as truth was once treated -- as
something more than the judgement of history, or the outcome of the play of competing
attributions.  We will have to treat expertise as `real' and develop a `normative theory of
expertise.'3
To those who share our feelings of political and academic unease with the existing
situation in science studies we want to suggest that the problem lies with the tension
described in our first paragraph: the tension between what we will call `the Problem of
Legitimacy' and `the Problem of Extension.'  Though science studies has resolved the
Problem of Legitimacy by showing that the basis of technical decision-making can and
should be widened beyond the core of certified experts, it has failed to solve the Problem of
Extension: `How far should participation in technical decision-making extend?'  In other
words, science studies has shown that there is more to scientific and technical expertise than
is compassed in the work of formally accredited scientists and technologists but it has not
told us how much more.
To save misunderstanding let us admit immediately that the practical politics of
technical decision-making still most often turn on the Problem of Legitimacy; the most
pressing work is usually to try to curtail the tendency for experts with formal qualifications
5to make ex-cathedra judgements curtained with secrecy.  Nevertheless, our problem is not
this one.  Our problem is academic; it is to find a clear rationale for the expansion of
expertise.  But a satisfying justification for expansion has to show, in a natural way, where
the limits are.  Perhaps this is not today's practical problem but with no clear limits to the
widening of the base of decision-making it might be tomorrow's.  It is just possible, of
course, that setting a limit on the extension of expertise will soothe the fears of those who
resist any widening of participation on the grounds that it will open the floodgates of
unreason.  It is just possible, then, that this exercise will help with today's practical problems
even though we approach the matter with a different aim in view.
Painting waves with a broad brush
This is in some ways a polemical paper and we proceed in a direct manner.  We start by
sketching idealised models of what we call `three waves' of science studies.  Violence is often
done when one compresses the work of many authors and thinkers into a few simple
formulae as the ludicrous accounts of sociology of scientific knowledge associated with the
`science wars' show us.  `Ask not for the meaning but the use,' Wittgenstein tells us, but here
we are setting out meanings with a somewhat cavalier attitude to use.  So we apologise to all
the contributors to these movements whose work we caricature and hope the violence is not
too great; fortunately, the project depends not on historical or scholarly accuracy but on
sketching the broad sweep of ideas.4
If what we paint with a broad brush is not totally unreasonable then it shows that the
First Wave of science studies had no Problem of Extension and was unaware of the Problem
of Legitimacy.  It shows why the Second Wave of science studies was good for solving the
Problem of Legitimacy that it inherited from Wave One, but that replaced it with the
Problem of Extension.  We propose that the Third Wave of science studies, and we might
only be labelling a movement that already exists in embryonic form, should accept the
Second Wave's solution to the Problem of Legitimacy but still draw a boundary around the
body of `technically-qualified-by-experience' contributors to technical decision-making.
To show that our argument is more than a programmatic gesture we will indicate
one way to start to build a normative theory of expertise and what it would mean for
technical decision-making.  There are, no doubt, many other ways to go about such an
exercise but to focus attention on the goal by providing an example of one approach to it is
at least a start.
6Language and presentation
Though we are going to talk about widening participation in technical decision-making we
will abandon the oxymoron `lay expertise.'5  As we see at the head of the paper, the
dictionary definition of `layman' includes the sentiment `someone who is not an expert' and
this makes it all too easy to over-interpret the term `lay expertise.'  If those who are not
experts can have expertise, what special reference does expertise have?  It might seem that
anyone can be an expert.  We say that those referred to by some other analysts as `lay
experts' are just plain `experts' albeit their expertise has not been recognised by certification;
crucially, they are not spread throughout the population but are found in small specialist
groups.  Instead of using the oxymoron we will refer to members of the public who have
special technical expertise in virtue of experience that is not recognised by degrees or other
certificates as `experience-based experts.'
Since all humans have enormous expertise in language speaking and every other
accomplishment that requires an understanding of social context, the term `experience-based
expertise,' if it is to do any work in this context, has to be used to refer to specialist abilities.
To use the term to mean something more general would strip it of its power to solve the
Problem of Extension.6
The nature of the exercise means that we need to move swiftly into our arguments
and therefore, in the main, we discuss earlier work which bears upon them in an Appendix.
The main body of the paper still contains some references, acknowledgements, and
discussions of previous work (mostly in the notes), but the Appendix deals more fully, if not
exhaustively, with the existing literature.  It shows where we agree and disagree in a
substantive way with certain others who have looked at the same problems and where our
approach differs markedly from work which may look similar at first glance.  And the
Appendix shows, if it needed showing, that the idea of a normative theory of decision-
making has been discussed by a long line of distinguished scholars.  It shows, then, that in so
far as we are trying to do something new, our aim is modest -- to try to discover a systematic
rationale for a normative theory of expertise that is compatible with sociology of scientific
knowledge and that contributes to the normative theory of decision-making that others have
essayed.  The Appendix follows the major section headings of the main text in so far as it
possible.
7THREE WAVES OF SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE
The First Wave of science studies
To simplify outrageously, let us say that there was once what seemed to many to be a golden
age before `the expertise problem' raised its head.  In the 1950s and 1960s social analysts
generally aimed at understanding, explaining, and effectively reinforcing the success of the
sciences rather than questioning their basis.7  In those days, for social scientists and public
alike, a good scientific training was seen to put a person in a position to speak with authority
and decisiveness in their own field, and often in other fields too.  Because the sciences were
thought of as esoteric as well as authoritative, it was inconceivable that decision-making in
matters that involved science and technology could travel in any other direction than from
the top down.  This wave of 'positivism' began to run into shallow academic waters in the
late 1960s with Kuhn's book and all that followed.  By the end of the 1970s, as an academic
movement, it had crashed onto the shore.8
The Second Wave of science studies
The following wave of science studies, which has run from the early 1970s, and continues to
run today, is often referred to as social constructivism, although it has many labels and many
variants.  One important variant is the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).  What has
been shown under Wave Two is that it is necessary to draw on 'extra-scientific factors' to
bring about the closure of scientific and technical debates -- scientific method, experiments,
observations, and theories are not enough.  With science reconceptualised as a social activity,
science studies has directed attention to the uses of scientific knowledge in social institutions
such as courts of law, schools, and policy processes such as public inquiries.  The emphasis
on the 'social construction' of science has meant, however, that when expertise is discussed
the focus is often on the attribution of the label 'expert' and the way the locus of legitimated
expertise is made to move between institutions.
By emphasising the ways in which scientific knowledge is like other forms of
knowledge sociologists have become uncertain about how to speak about what makes it
different; in the same way they have become unable to distinguish between experts and non-
experts.  Sociologists have become so successful at dissolving dichotomies and classes that
they no longer dare to construct them.  We believe, however, that sociologists of knowledge
should not be afraid of their expertise and must be ready to claim their place as experts in
the field of knowledge itself.  Sociologists of knowledge must be ready to build categories
having to do with knowledge; we must be ready, then, to develop a `knowledge science'
8using knowledge and expertise as analysts' categories.  SEE, the Third Wave of Science
Studies, is one approach.
Downstream to upstream
An important strand in our argument is to indicate the compatibility of a normative
theory of expertise with what has been achieved in Wave Two.  The relationship between
Wave One and Wave Two is not the same as the relationship between Wave Two and Wave
Three.  Wave Two replaced Wave One with much richer descriptions of science based on
careful observation and a relativist methodology or even philosophy.  Wave Two showed
that Wave One was intellectually bankrupt.  Wave Three, however, does not show that Wave
Two is intellectually bankrupt.  In this strange sea, Wave Two continues to roll on even as
Wave Three builds up.9  Wave Three is one of the ways in which Wave Two can be applied
to a set of problems that Wave Two alone cannot handle in an intellectually coherent way.
Wave Three involves finding a special rationale for science and technology even while we
accept the findings of Wave Two -- that science and technology are much more ordinary
than we once thought.  The aim of the paper, one might say, is to hammer a piton into the
ice wall of relativism with enough delicacy not to shatter the whole edifice (the destruction
that so many critics believe is the only solution).
To be willing to find a rationale for a special place for science and technology, now
that so much has been deconstructed under the Second Wave of science studies, means
reconstructing knowledge.  As we have said, the Third Wave of science studies must
emphasise the role of expertise as an analyst's category as well as an actor's category and this
will allow prescriptive rather than merely descriptive statements about the role of expertise
in the public sphere.
The shift to a prescriptive theory of expertise, as commentators have pointed out,
seems incompatible with much that the authors of this paper have previously argued.
Commentators have said that it follows from Wave Two analyses, with which the authors
have been, and still are, closely associated, that the `experts' who play a role in a debate can
be distinguished `only after the dust has settled, after it becomes clear whose claims became
convincing in the ongoing course of things.'  And that: `it does not matter who defines the
expert, actor or analyst.  Judgements of who the experts are always lay downstream.'10  We
might label this the `expert's regress,' on analogy with the experimenter's regress.  Because of
the experimenter's regress the class of successful replications of an experiment can be
identified only with hindsight; because of the expert's regress the class of experts can be
identified only with hindsight.  The trouble is that the expert's regress gives no more positive
9help with the problem of technical decision-making in the public domain than the
experimenter's regress gives positive help with settling scientific controversies.  But decisions
of public concern have to be made according to a timetable established within the political
sphere not the scientific or technical sphere; the decisions have to be made before the
scientific dust has settled because the pace of politics is faster than the pace of scientific
consensus formation.  Political decision-makers are, therefore, continually forced to define
classes of expert before the dust has settled -- before the judgements of history have been
made.  In defining classes of expert actors in the political sphere they are making history
rather than reflecting on it.  What we are arguing is that sociologists of scientific knowledge,
per se, might also have a duty to make history as well as reflect on it; they have a role to play
in making history in virtue of their area of expertise -- `knowledge.'11
The dilemma is not a new one and has been present within Wave Two all along
though largely unremarked.  One of the current authors has discussed it in the course of his
work on artificial intelligence (AI).  Here, rather than reflecting upon the way the
controversy about AI unfolded, he found himself taking an active part in the controversy,
using his knowledge about knowledge to contribute to the debate.  He referred to this
activity, in contrast with more reflective science studies, as `knowledge science.'12  We might
say that in knowledge science one works to affect the flow of the river of history rather than
examining its turns and eddies.  In the same way, what we are doing here is `upstream work'
rather than `downstream work.'13
Doing upstream work without abandoning the insights of Wave Two may involve a
degree of compartmentalisation of activity, but compartmentalisation can often be avoided
only on pain of paralysis.14  It is also worth noting that, for better or worse, in Wave Two
work involving tacit knowledge and its consequences for replication of experiments and so
forth, experimental and other skills have always been used as an `upstream' category --
something real and fixed that can be transferred from one person to another, or can fail to
be transferred.  Indeed that idea has already been used upstream in an attempt to smooth
and steer the course of science.15
Let us try one more way of putting the matter.  Wave Two deals with the problem:
`How is scientific consensus formed?'  Some form of relativism in respect of the outcome of
that consensus is vital if the answer is not to risk circularity.  Wave three deals with the
problem: `How do you make decisions based on scientific knowledge before there is an
absolute scientific consensus?'  Wave Three does not replace Wave Two because the
problems are different.  For Wave Three something in addition to relativism is needed.  One
way to approach the problem of Wave Three is to look at the way science is granted
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legitimacy in the political, legal, or other spheres, and much existing writing in science
studies which deals with science in the public domain has approached the problem in this
way.  But what we are trying to understand is why science should be granted legitimacy
because of the kind of knowledge it is.  In the case of this question referring back to the way
it is granted is what carries the risk of circularity.  We are asking the same kind of question
about what makes science special as the sociologist Robert Merton and any number of
philosophers and political theorists asked in the aftermath of the Second World War.  But
we are trying to answer it in the aftermath of the demise of Wave One.
We understand, of course, that any arguments we put forward will merely enter the
stream as another ripple rather than divert it wholesale, and we realise that any ideas that are
found useful in the paper will themselves be used as devices within continuing debates about
the boundaries of expertise and the like.  Realising this, however, is not a reason to give up --
the course of the stream might be at least slightly changed by such an intervention.16
Core-Sets, Core-Groups, and their Settings
We now build up our approach to Wave Three in yet another way, using diagrams to enrich
the exposition.  Though our problem is about sciences and technologies in the public
domain we will start with the esoteric sciences.  No doubt other approaches are possible, for
example treating `public domain sciences and technologies' (those which directly affect,
rather then merely being of interest to, the public), as essentially different to the esoteric
sciences, but we have chosen a different analytic strategy.  Starting with the esoteric sciences
has the advantage that they are familiar to the authors and that they are the traditional `hard
case' starting point for more general studies of science.  We find that it is possible to work
outward from our esoteric starting point in a coherent manner, ending up with the public
domain sciences which are our target.
A core-set has been defined as being made up of those scientists deeply involved in
experimentation or theorisation which is directly relevant to a scientific controversy or
debate.  A core-set is often quite small -- perhaps a dozen scientists or a half-dozen groups.
A core-group is the much more solidaristic group of scientists which emerges after a
controversy has been settled for all practical purposes.17  If the science is esoteric, then only
the members of the core-set or core-group (hereafter `core-scientists') can legitimately
contribute to the formation of the consensus or develop the science thereafter.18  It is not
always easy to define the boundaries of a core-set because disputes within core-sets often
involve the 'boundary work' of trying to define people in or out, that is, define them as
legitimate or illegitimate commentators.19  Nevertheless, if one takes a really esoteric
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scientific controversy such as that over the detection of gravitational waves, or the detection
of solar neutrinos, or the likelihood that binary neutron stars will collapse into black holes
just before they spiral into each other, or if one takes the sciences that follow after them,
then members of Western society know, without having to agonise, that anyone who is not a
recognised physicist with a great deal of equipment or special theoretical knowledge will not
be, and should not be, counted as a member of the set of decision-makers in respect of the
scientific knowledge itself.  Were members to take a different view of this matter they would
no longer participate in Western scientific society as the term is used here.  There are those
who would not accept that scientists have any special rights even in these esoteric matters,
but here we must simply state our starting point as members of the scientific community
broadly conceived, and contributors to Western scientific society, `we think they do.'  This is
a reference to our culture, not a reference to the way political legitimacy is granted in our
society.  Should any politician one ever want to dismantle the right of the scientific
community to settle esoteric issues within science, we would want to fight them.
As was pointed out to us, under Wave Two much intellectual leverage was gained precisely
by denying the kind of sentiment that is taken to be self-evident in the last paragraph and
those that follow.20  We were asked whether we would be so happy to restrict judgement to
such a small circle were the issue to be the importance of Tracey Emins's unmade bed,
notoriously displayed by the Tate Gallery as an avante-garde work of art.  It was said: `No-
one without the training and exposure to appropriate gallery-going is ...  `competent' [to
make a judgement].  So, can one derive the conclusion that only they should judge art?'  And
the implication is certainly correct that we all feel we have something to say on the matter of
`the bed.'  It was suggested that in respect of `the bed' one could reach the conclusion that
only a narrow range of people are competent to judge only if one makes realist-type
assumptions about the quality of works of art.  It was suggested that the same must go for
the argument when applied to science.
These comments are correct in that it is necessary to make an assumption of a kind
that is untypical of Wave Two if we want to restrict the sphere of judgement in science.  But
this seems to be inevitable if we want to do upstream work.  That is why we have set out our
assumptions as clearly as possible here and we do not think we can do better than say `this is
the kind of society we like -- one where we do consider that scientists with experience of an
esoteric specialism are the best people to make judgements about what should count as truth
within that specialism.'  When placed alongside the terrible experiences of humans and
humanity at the hands of others, what follows from the `post-modernist' approach to
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knowledge is not that it is impossible to make judgements between plural realities but that
sometimes one just has to make judgements without timeless intellectual justification.21
Science and Art
Later on we will consider kinds of expertise that are different to those found in the
esoteric sciences.  At this point, however, it is worth noting something interesting in the
comments made to us.  It was suggested that restricting the circle of judges, in the case of
esoteric science, to the core-set, is equivalent to restricting the circle of judges, in the case of
`the bed,' to those with training and exposure to appropriate gallery-going.  The appropriate
group of judges, it was said, is not artists in general, nor even artists of the type who display
their unmade beds etc, but art critics.  In language we will explain more fully later in the
paper, this is a class of experts with `interactional expertise' rather than `contributory
expertise.'  It may be that this is one of the ways in which science and art are different.  The
end-point of art, after all, is to be experienced and that is why it is reasonable to suppose that
those with special viewing, or experiencing, expertise -- critics -- rather than those with
special creative expertise -- artists -- would be the best judges.22  Science, on the other hand,
is less obviously directed at consumers and it is less clear that the audience has so much in
the way of interpretative rights where it is concerned.23  This might indicate that in the case
of science those who actually do it (who have contributory expertise), might have more
relative merit as judges of scientific value than critics (those with interactional expertise), as
compared with the case of art.  So though we will cleave to our claim about the self-evidence
of the nature of judgement in esoteric science we would not want to be drawn to generalise
the claim in respect of art or other cultural endeavours and this analysis shows us one reason
why one might not be a good analogy for the other.24
Politics is intrinsic to esoteric science, not extrinsic.
In setting out our view about who has the best claim to judge truth in the esoteric
sciences we have made a prescriptive statement about expertise!  Since, as we have
intimated, it is hard to get an `ought' from an `is' our prescriptive statement is based on a
clearly stated preference about a certain form-of-life and what follows from it.  We have
argued that this preference and its corollaries do not necessarily hold in the case of art.  We
will also argue that they do not hold in the case of public domain science.  Thus, given
common agreement on the self-evident nature of the case for esoteric sciences, we have
already established that to understand the importance of contributions to technical decision-
making by different elements of society it is necessary to know what kind of science we are
dealing with.  Our analytic strategy is to proceed by drawing out the systematic differences
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between esoteric sciences and other sciences starting with the core-set as found in the
esoteric sphere.
One can represent a core-set as the bull's-eye of a 'target diagram' with two or more
rings surrounding it.
Figure 1:  Core Scientists in the Wider Setting
In Figure 1 the 'bull's eye' is the core-set, the first ring out represents the scientific
community who have no special knowledge or experience of the esoteric which concern the
core-set, while the third ring represents the general public.  Other rings might be used to
represent the media and/or scientific funders and policy makers but we do not need them
for the purposes of this analysis.
It might be thought that the stress on the scientific pre-eminence and exclusiveness
of core-scientists in esoteric sciences flies in the face of the whole Wave Two analysis.
According to the sociology of scientific knowledge, politics is never absent from the centre.
Sometimes this will be the politics of the scientific community, but sometimes `big-P'
politics will play a significant role.  This claim remains valid even for us, self-proclaimed,
members of Western scientific society; indeed, one of the authors of this very paper was one
of the first to describe the issue in print.  How is this position compatible with the
prescriptive statement we have just made, that in the case of esoteric sciences: `anyone who
is not a recognised physicist with a great deal of equipment or special theoretical knowledge
will not be or should not be, counted as a member of the decision-making group?'
Public
Scientific
Community
Core
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The answer is that in these cases it is the esoteric decision-making group alone that
disposes of the political influences that bear upon it.  Thus, in what is probably the clearest
example of this genre which involved `big-P' politics, Shapin showed that in Nineteenth
Century Edinburgh, scientists studying the brain observed features that were homologous
with their position in local Edinburgh politics, and that the core-set were influenced by such
considerations in reaching their conclusions.25  And yet it would be quite wrong to say that
because the phrenology debate was influenced by Edinburgh politics it would have been
right for the brain scientists, and the public they served, to have consulted local Edinburgh
politicians in order to form their opinions on brain structure.  Such a view would, quite
properly, be counted as encouraging `bias' and would be incompatible with the `form-of-life'
of Western science.  Anyone who held such a view would, by that fact, prefer to inhabit a
different social and conceptual space to the authors of this paper.  What Shapin's and similar
studies show is that politics of this sort may influence science but not that it is a legitimate
input to scientific decision-making.  Setting aside Lysenkoism and the like -- still seen as
pathologies by members of Western scientific society -- one would never set out to design
scientific or political institutions to enhance the influence of `big-P' politics on the content
of such an esoteric science, one would do quite the opposite.26  We might say that the SSK
studies show that politics is `intrinsic' to science but they do not licence `extrinsic' political
influence.27
Thus, while SSK-type studies reveal various influences on the formation of views
within science, they do not legitimate it any more than the revelation of similar influences in
the justice system would legitimate their enhancement.  In justice as in esoteric science, one
always tries to minimise external influence.  Later, we will re-examine the question for less
esoteric sciences and find it more complicated, but at least we have shown how to break into
the Problem of Extension in spite of what has been learned under Wave Two.  More exactly,
we have discovered that those of us who think of ourselves as living in Western scientific
society have always lived with a partial solution to the Problem of Extension even while we
were emphasising the non-expert influences on expert decisions.  The `circle was squared'
because under Wave Two our analyses were descriptive not prescriptive: the hidden
preferences were preserved because we never discussed them.  We might say, in respect of
our search for a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate inputs into esoteric scientific
knowledge making, that even those of us who have been practising SSK without
compromise, have been `speaking prose all along' -- it has been the prose of the form-of-life
of Western science.   This is to reiterate the point already made about the degree of largely
unremarked compartmentalisation already found in Wave Two.28
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Beyond the Core
According to the sociology of scientific knowledge, 'distance lends enchantment.'29  Core-
scientists are continually exposed, in case of dispute, to the counter-arguments of their
fellows and, as a result, are slow to reach complete certainty about any conclusion.  In
general it is those in the next ring out -- the non-specialists in the scientific community  --
who, in the short term, reach the greatest certainty about matters scientific.
These outsiders reach certainty more easily than core-scientists because they learn of
goings on in the core of the science only through digested sources such as conversations
with their colleagues, scientific journals, the scientific media, and the broadcast media.
Inevitably such sources condense and simplify -- that is their job.  Only exposure to the lived
history of the core-set can reveal the richness of a dispute and its potential for being re-
opened.  For those at the heart of matters, scientific disputes are seen to linger on long after
the wider community takes matters to be settled.30
There is a second reason why debate closes down in the wider community before it
closes in the core-set.  The consumers, as opposed to the producers, of scientific knowledge
have no use for small uncertainties.  Decisions about action generally involve binary choices
-- 'we will fund cold-fusion or we won't;' 'we will impose a carbon tax or we won't.'  When a
decision is made to act it can 'read back' on the scientific debate at its core and make any
remaining doubts harder to sustain.  (Though there are circumstances in which exposure to
the public opens controversy rather than closes it down.)
We can represent some of these processes by modifying the target diagram.  The
diagram can be stretched horizontally and the left-to-right dimension used to represent the
passage of time.  The vertical dimension will be used to represent uncertainty.  Thus, in
Figure 2, the processes that take place in a core-set are represented by a narrowing triangle;
as time goes on uncertainty decreases, though never quite reaching an apex of certainty.
Figure 2: Core Elongated in Time
The next figure, Figure 3, reintroduces the wider scientific community  -- the
rectangle.  Now we see that an apex of certainty has been added to the core-set but it has
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been added not by the core-set's deliberations but by those in the next area out -- the wider
scientific community.  The apex of certainty is shown, therefore, as belonging to this group.
The line representing the wider scientific community changes from dashes to solid only as it
begins to play its part in the perception of the outcome of the science.  This is the process
that has been labelled `distance lends enchantment.'
Figure 3: Apex of Certainty Constructed by Wider Scientific Community
Figure 4 introduces the general public.  In esoteric sciences which are controversial
the public merely watches as disputes play out, but when the science becomes popularised
the apex of certainty becomes public property.  The next generation of scientists are also
introduced to these certainties by textbook writers who collapse the time dimension of the
science they write about.  It is only the apex of certainty that is visible to these new
generations and all the preceding years of experimentation and argument disappear into it.31
Figure 4: Apex of Certainty Visible to Public
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The processes represented in figures 1 to 4 show how the nature and the history of science
are turned into a mythology as a result of exposure beyond the core-set.  Exposing and
exploring the details of the process has been a major part of Wave Two.  The potential for
damage to science occurs when sciences find themselves exposed to the public early on,
before consensus has developed within the core-set.  Under these circumstances
expectations developed from exposure to the view represented in Figure 4 are applied to
sciences at a time when core-set debates are too unsettled (too wide in the vertical
dimension), to give rise to a robust apex of certainty.  The situation is represented in Figure
5: the dotted areas to the right of the solid vertical line are still in the future; the public sees
the left hand end of the core-set and expects, or at least is generally believed by policy-
makers to expect, the same kind of outcomes as they have previously seen at the right hand
end.32  But now they find that the scientists, who previously revealed a relatively united and
robust front, argue with each other with different sides having rough parity; they change
their minds, and are no longer a source of confidence.  It is easy to understand why scientists
prefer to keep their work private until they have reached unity.
Figure 5: Science Becomes Visible Before it Becomes Certain
We might look at this situation in the following way: in the 1970s, sociologists began to
study scientific controversies as `breaching experiments' which opened up the hard, formal,
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though mythical, shell of science exposing the soft social inside filled with seeds of everyday
thought.33  When the left hand end of a core-set is publicly exposed, it too is a kind of
breaching experiment, but one visible to all; everyone gets to see the soft flesh of the
scientific fruit and the familiar passions and arguments that constitute it.  Both kinds of
breaching experiment show that scientists rely on ordinary reasoning to bring their technical
arguments to a conclusion and this closes the gap between science and the rest of us.
Suddenly, the conclusions formally wrought by science alone are the property of everyone
and each has a right to contribute their opinion along with that of the no-longer-so-special
scientists.  This is where Wave Two, just like the Beck and Giddens approach (see
Appendix), struggles with the question of how to weight the opinions of the myriad
potential contributors.
The Third Wave of science studies?
The Third Wave of science studies, SEE, turns, as we have said, on a normative theory of
expertise.  The aim is to approach the question of who should and who should not be
contributing to decision-making in virtue of their expertise.  Crucially, rights based on
expertise must be understood one way while rights accruing to other `stakeholders,' who do
not have any special technical expertise, must be understood another way.  Stakeholder
rights are not denied, but they play a different role to the rights emerging from expertise.  In
a rather old-fashioned way, reminiscent of Wave One, Wave Three separates the scientific
and technical input to decision-making from the political input.  This is not an attempt to go
back to Wave One because Wave Three takes into account all that has been learned during
Wave Two and, as we stress, Wave Two runs on as strongly as before; we are trying, under
Wave Three, to reconstruct knowledge not rediscover it.  Thus under Wave One political
rights made almost no contribution to technical decision-making, being almost entirely
overwhelmed by top-down expertise; under Wave Three, expert and political rights can be
seen to be much more balanced because of the new understanding of contested science that
emerged from Wave Two.  To represent this feature of Wave Three we cut the diagram in
half horizontally, reserving the bottom half for political and stakeholder rights, and the top
half for scientific and technical debate.  Scientists and technologists appear twice in this
diagram.  They appear in the bottom section of the diagram because they have rights as
citizens and stakeholders; they appear in the top half in virtue of the rights that grow out of
their specialist expertise.
Figure 6:  Uncertified Experts and the Core
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In Figure 6 the top half of the oval contains the core-set.  We have simplified the
figure in one important respect compared to the previous diagrams.  The wider scientific
community no longer plays any special part in the decision-making process.  Henceforward,
in our treatment, the wider scientific community is indistinguishable from the citizenry in
general.34  This, we would argue, is more than an analytic convenience: the wider scientific
community should be seen as indistinguishable from the citizenry as a whole; the idea that
scientists have special authority purely in virtue of their scientific qualifications and training
has often been misleading and damaging.  Scientists, as scientists, have nothing special to
offer toward technical decision-making in the public domain where the specialisms are not
their own, therefore scientists as a group are found in the bottom half of the diagram.  In
making this clear, Wave Three differs markedly from Wave One.
Within the top half of the oval, Figure 6 shows a small rectangle representing
experience-based experts.  The rectangle of experience-based experts feeds into the core-set.
This is another way in which Wave Three departs from Wave Two.  Wave Three, as we have
said, distinguishes between two kinds of citizens' rights in technical decision-making.  There
are those from the bottom half of the oval, which we have already mentioned.  And there
are those in the top half, which accrue in virtue of the existence of pockets of expertise
among the citizenry, and which are properly described as being within the technical rather
than the political domain.  Under Wave Two it has been easy to confuse these types of
expertise with rights accruing within the political sphere.  Wave One located all expertise
within the scientific community; Wave Two, reacting to this incorrect picture, made it hard
to distinguish between scientific expertise and political rights; Wave Three is intended to re-
establish the distinction but with the dividing line set in a different place within the
population.  This difference in approach is summed up in Figure 7.
TECHNICAL
DIMENSION
POLITICAL
DIMENSION
Core-set
Uncertified experts
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Figure 7:  Three Waves of  Science Studies
Figure 7 shows the location of expertise as conceptualised under the three idealised waves of
science studies.  Crucially, under Wave One, the dividing line was horizontal, separating the
certified scientific community from the laity; under Wave Three it is vertical, separating
specialist experts, whether certified or not, from non-specialists, whether certified or not.
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE
We now begin to develop a classification of expertise which will help us understand what is
in the rectangular box that lies within the technical sphere (Figure 6), and the odd shaped
pockets of expertise found among the lay public (Figure 7).  The classification will show how
WAVE ONE
The age of authority
WAVE TWO
The age of democracy
WAVE THREE
The age of expertise
Wave 3 and Wave 1 differ epistemologically and politically.
SCIENTISTS
PUBLIC
No boundaries
Truth Class
Laity
No boundary
Certified
Uncertified
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the rights that accrue from expertise differ from more diffuse political rights.  The object is
to develop a discourse of expertise that will help to put citizens' expertise in proper
perspective alongside scientists' expertise.
To carry out this task it is necessary to recognise and categorise, not only different
types of expertise, but also different types of science.  Much excellent work has been done
under Wave Two by `deconstructing dichotomies' dissolving boundaries, and the like, but
like it or not, the world is made of distinctions and boundaries.  One of the styles of Wave
Two argument is to concentrate on boundary problems.  It is shown, and it can often be
easily shown, that the boundary between entity `A' and entity `B' is unclear and it is often
argued that this means that A and B are not really separate things at all.  Interesting studies
of the way actors create and patrol boundaries can then be carried out.35  Some writers,
however, have gone further and taken the fuzziness of many boundaries as the empirical
counterpart of a philosophical prescription: `Dissolve all dichotomies.'  Here we approach
from the other direction.  We intend to point to differences by starting at the extreme points
of our continuum -- we will take `ideal types' of this kind or that kind of expertise as our
initial examples and worry about the boundary problems later.  In this way it is possible to
begin to think about how different kinds of expertise combine in social life and how they
should combine in technical decision-making.  There will be no clean and easy solution
because the boundary problems present themselves not only to the analyst, but also to the
actors as any potential new institution enters the arena of political discourse.  Nevertheless,
the first step must be to develop the appropriate terms for the discourse; we must learn a
language which facilitates talk about the kinds of expertise that are relevant to the dilemma
with which the discussion began.  It follows that the types of expertise we discuss must be
treated as `real.'36
Experience and expertise
What kinds of expertise are candidates for reification?37  The very term `experience-
based experts' that we adopt to describe those whose expertise has not been recognised in
the granting of certificates shows how important experience is to our exercise in
demarcation.  Experience, however, cannot be the defining criterion of expertise.  It may be
necessary to have experience in order to have experience-based expertise but it is not
sufficient.  One might, for example, have huge experience of lying in bed in the morning but
this does not make one an expert at it (except in an amusing ironic sense).  Why not?
Because it is taken that anyone could master it immediately without practice so nothing in
the way of skill has been gained through the experience.
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More difficult, one might have huge experience at drawing up astrological charts but
one would not want to say that this gives one the kind of expertise that enables one to
contribute to technical decision-making in the public domain.  Why not?  Here, unlike lying
in bed, an esoteric skill has been mastered which could not be mimicked by just anyone -- at
least not the extent that it could pass among skilled practitioners of astrological charts.
Astrology is, rather, disqualified by its content.  It is hard to say much about which kinds of
expertise are excluded in this way but we can say something.38
Turner (see note 2) divides expertise up into five kinds according to the way they
obtain legitimacy from their consumers.  For Turner, the first kind of expertise is like that of
physics which has gained a kind of universal authority across society in virtue of what
everyone believes to be its efficacy.  Type II expertise has been granted legitimacy only
among a restricted group or sect of adherents.  Turner gives theology as his example, and we
might put astrological expertise in the same category.  Type III experts, such as new kinds of
health or psychological `therapist,' create their own adherents, or groups of followers.  Type
IV and Type V experts have their adherents created for them by professional agencies which
set themselves up to promote a new kind of expert, or, like government departments,
become specialist consumers of new kinds of expertise.
Our concern, in this paper, is very largely with Type I expertise.  But what argument
might we provide to justify stopping at Type I expertise?  This remains an unresolved
problem for upstream work in SSK.  The best we can do is note that the adherents of all the
kinds of expertise we value positively, were they to have what we will call `contributory
expertise' (see below), could make a reasonable claim to be members of the core-set relevant
to any particular technical decision.  That is to say, their expertise would be continuous with
the core-set's expertise rather than discontinuous with it; astrology and theology are
discontinuous with those of radiation ecology, whereas the expertise of sheep farmers is
not.39
In drawing a boundary around legitimate contributors to decision-making, then, two
kinds of judgement are made in logical sequence.  The first judgement is about what fields of
experience are relevant.  We might decide, for example, that astronomy is relevant to some
question and astrology is not in spite of the claims of its adherents.  But we have almost
nothing to say here about this choice except the groping remarks just made about continuity
and discontinuity and a reference back to the form of life of Western science.  Our views on
which fields are legitimate and which are not are certainly not fixed for all time and they may
change as the flux of history brings one field out from the cold and pushed another into it.40
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Nevertheless this choice has to be made ahead of the choice of who is an expert within a
field.  The point is clarified in Figure 8
FIGURE 8: EXPERTISE IN CONSENSUAL AND FRINGE SCIENCES
MAINSTREAM  FRINGE
 (eg astronomy)   (eg astrology)
YES                 1                                        2
EXPERT
PRACTITIONER
NO                  3                                       4
In box 4 are inexpert and inexperienced practitioners of fringe fields whereas box 2 contains
expert astrologers, remote-viewers, and forth.  In box 3 are found inexpert practitioners of
fields which are acceptable to the broad consensus of Western science --people who are just
bad at science.  In box 1 are the experts in consensual fields.  We have, as indicated, very
little to say about the horizontal dimension in this table except that it is there -- our concern
is with the vertical dimension of the left hand side of the table.  The burden of the paper is
that there are people who qualified and credentialed scientists would want to consign to box
3 who ought to belong in box 1.  Our licence for saying this is the expertise, drawn from
SSK, in the matter of the nature of science and knowledge.  In particular, Wave Two studies
of the essential craft content of science has shown that it is more difficult to separate the
credentialed scientist from the experienced practitioner than was once thought: when we
move toward experience as a criterion of expertise the boundary around science softens and
the set of activities known as science merges into expertise in general.  But box 3, as we have
stressed, still contains only small subsets of the population at large.41
Choice between fields and expertise within a field are, then, orthogonal.
Disagreement is on yet another orthogonal dimension (in Figure 8 one can visualise it
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coming up out of the page).  Thus, as the core-set studies show over and over again, experts,
all of whom belong in box 1, disagree.  It merely complicates matters a little that they
sometimes express their disdain for other experts with whom they disagree by saying that
they do not belong in box 1 at all but should be relegated to box 2.  It is, of course, no
surprise that officially appointed radiation scientists might disagree with the views of
Cumbrian sheep farmers even though their knowledge of sheep is continuous with the sheep
farmers knowledge and it is no surprise that they might express their disagreement by saying
that these sheep farmers are not experts.  We (i.e. sociologists of scientific knowledge) claim
the right to disagree about this last judgement.
To sum up once more, what we are dealing with is types of expertise that are actually
or potentially continuous with what Turner calls Type I expertise.  The classification that we
need lies, then, within the envelopes of the categories of expertise discussed by Turner, and
mostly within the envelope of his Type I.  Our classification is, perforce, of a kind which is
quite different to his.42
Three types of expertise
There are dozens of ways of classifying competence and expertise.43  Classifying competence
is the basis of much educational theory, psychology of intelligence, sociology of
employment, and so forth.  It also forms the foundation of the study of artificial intelligence
and expert systems.  One of the authors of this paper has himself classified expertise in
several different ways.44  Here we choose our starting point for our classification on the basis
of familiarity.  We thought it might be persuasive to begin with something that many
potential readers know about from first hand experience.  We start, then, with ourselves and
our practices as sociologists of scientific knowledge.
One way in which the group of analysts who practice SSK have to confront the
concept of expertise is in the problem they themselves face in trying to gain a cultural
foothold in the areas of those sciences they want to analyse.  Typically, SSK fieldworkers
enter scientific fields which they do not know and try to learn enough about them to do
sociological analyses.  Rarely, however, do they reach the level of expertise of a full-blown
participant.  In the case of the esoteric sciences the fieldworker hardly ever participates in
the science itself.  Thus, to begin with, by reflecting on certain sociologists' fieldwork
experiences, we can distinguish three levels of expertise:
1.) No expertise:  That is the degree of expertise with which the fieldworker sets out; it
is insufficient to conduct a sociological analysis or do quasi-participatory fieldwork.
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2.) Interactional expertise: This means enough expertise to interact interestingly with
participants and carry out a sociological analysis.
3.) Contributory expertise: This means enough expertise to contribute to the science of
the field being analysed.
Since reflecting on the practice of sociologists tells us that there is a difference between these
three states, we have made an another important step: We have begun to understand
expertise as an analyst's category as well as an actor's category.  In this case expertise is as
analyst's category in a very direct way: it is a category which analysts use to think about
themselves and this is why we think it is a persuasive starting point.  Since we already use
this language to describe ourselves (speaking prose all along!) there should be fewer
obstacles to using it to describe other actors.45
Of course, these three categories are ideal types and as with most such classifications
there will be boundary problems.  For example, the attainment of category 2 is hotly
disputed by 'science warriors' who frequently claim that sociologists do not have enough
scientific expertise to carry out their sociological analyses and have failed to escape category
1.  We could, if we wanted, give an attributory account of our own experience: What does
count as having enough expertise to do fieldwork, or even to contribute to a science?  The
trick, however, is not to become paralysed by these problems but proceed with an imperfect
set of classifications just as other experts proceed.  Instead of worrying about the
imperfections of our science we should note that the very fact that we, as sociologists of
science, work hard to acquire a level of expertise that enables us to defend ourselves against
the charge of being insufficiently expert shows that we do not act as though it is all a matter
of attribution.  As empirical researchers in the sociology of knowledge we act as though
there is something in the nature of expertise that can be acquired if we work at it.
Furthermore, at least some of us have found that we have been unable to acquire sufficient
expertise to analyse certain scientific fields to our satisfaction, and this too is a salutary
experience.46  Again, just occasionally, we do manage to acquire enough expertise in some
field we study to begin to contribute.47  Thus, though there are boundary and definitional
problems, but they do not have to be fatal.
Having accepted that to categorise expertise makes sense in spite of the boundary
problems, the task is to begin to work out what these types of expertise mean and how they
fit together.  For example, having interactional expertise does not give one contributory
expertise, but one might think the former was a necessary condition for the later.  But it may
not be!  We will work out some of these differences by referring to what is fast becoming the
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paradigm study of so-called `lay expertise,' Wynne's study of the relationship between
scientists and sheep farmers after the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster
contaminated the Cumbrian fells.48
Wynne found that the sheep farmers knew a great deal about the ecology of sheep
and the behaviour of rainwater on the fells that was relevant to the discussion of how the
sheep should be treated so as to minimise the impact of the contamination.  Since the
Windscale-Sellafield plant was built soon after the Second World War, the farmers in the
locality had long experience of the ecology of sheep exposed to radioactive waste.  The
farmers have all the characteristics of a core-set of experts in terms of experience in the
ecology of hill sheep on mildly radioactive grassland even though they had no formal
qualifications.  In our terms, the farmers had contributory expertise which in some respects
exceeded that of ministry scientists.
The scientists, however, were reluctant to take any advice from the farmers.  Now,
for the farmers to have contributed to the science they would not have had to engage in a
symmetrical conversation with the scientific experts -- all that would have been necessary
was for the scientific experts to try to learn from the farmers.  This seemingly trivial point
helps us to understand what expertise is, but also points out where the social location of
change needs to be.  The normative point that follows is that the body of expertise that
should have emerged in respect of Cumbrian sheep was a combination of the separate
contributory expertise possessed by the scientists and the farmers.  The scientists' expertise
was not at risk of being displaced by that of the farmers; it was, or should have been, added
to by that of the farmers.  Should the situation have been symmetrical it might have been an
arbitrary matter whether the farmers' expertise was absorbed by the scientists or the
scientists' expertise was absorbed by the farmers, but it was not symmetrical.  To produce
the optimum outcome the scientists needed to have the interactional expertise to absorb the
expertise of the farmers.  Unfortunately, they seemed reluctant either to develop or use such
expertise.49  Here we begin to see how our theory of the inter-relationship of types of
expertise might gain in richness and practical relevance.  We have two theses:
Thesis 1: Only one set of experts need have interactional competence in the expertise of
another set of experts for a combination of contributory expertises to take place.
Thesis 2: In such a case, only the party with the interactional expertise can take responsibility
for combining the expertise [s].
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Thesis 2 says something about the social responsibility of different parties, but there could
also be a 'Thesis 3' that says something more prescriptive still about how these different
parties should interact:
Thesis 3: In such circumstances the party without the interactional expertise in respect of the
other party should be represented by someone with enough interactional expertise to make
sure the combination is done with integrity.
In effect, Thesis 3 is suggesting that the Cumbrian farmers might well have had more
success in their dealings with the BNFL scientists if their concerns were mediated by a
Greenpeace scientist, a Brian Wynne, or the like.  Clearly such an individual would need to
be briefed by the farmers about what the certified scientists were doing wrong, but such a
person may have been able to phrase the problem in ways more familiar to the scientists,
making it more credible (or less resistible).  This problem was recognised by AIDS treatment
activists in the US who found that they had to learn the language of science if they were to
represent the interests of the wider community within the clinical trials process.50
Referred expertise
Sometimes expertise in one field can be applied in another.  A third category of expertise
which seems to be needed to make sense of decision-making is what we will call `Referred
Expertise.'  Referred Expertise is, as it were, expertise `at one remove.'  Consider the
managers and leaders of large scientific projects.  In general they will not possess
contributory expertise in respect of the many fields of science they must co-ordinate.  In the
field study of one of the authors this became a bone of contention.  As one expert scientist
put it:
...  What I found disappointing was that after two years the project manager still
didn't really know what it meant to do interferometric detection of gravitational
waves.
Whereas a manager saw it this way:
Once you professionalize, the guys who are very good in the lab where you control
everything, no longer have their arms around it all.  Other people can work very well
in that environment.  They interface with the experts who built the electronics and
understand what they need to of that; they interface with the computer people and
do very well at that; and some people can work in this broader environment
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technically.  Some people make the mistake of saying that as soon as you are in this
broader environment it's a management problem; it's not a management problem!
The technical part is actually more technical and more sophisticated.
If we stay with the terminology we have developed so far we would have to say that in
respect of the science they are managing, the managers have only interactional expertise
(and, one would hope, discrimination and the ability translate too -- see below).  But in so far
as they have contributory expertise it is expertise in management rather than science.  Does
this mean that their scientific expertise is no greater than that of, say, the visiting sociologist?
The answer has to be `no' or our theory would be reduced to the absurd (as well as
disagreeing head-on with the last sentiment expressed in the above quotation).51
The resolution seems to be that to manage a scientific project at a technical level
requires not contributory expertise in the sciences in question but experience of contributory
expertise in some related science.52  In other words, the managers must know, from their
own experience, what it is to have contributory expertise; this puts them in a position to
understand what is involved in making a contribution to the fields of the scientists they are
leading at one remove.  As one might have `referred pain' in a leg as a result of back injury,
this is `referred expertise.'  It would be quite reasonable to expect that managers of scientific
projects with referred contributory expertise would manage much better (and with much
more authority and legitimacy), than those without it.53
Translation
There are at least two more kinds of ability that go into the making of technical judgements
of the kind we are discussing.  These are the ability to translate and to discriminate.  For
groups of experts to talk to each other, translation may be necessary.  Some people have a
special ability to take on the position of the 'other' and to alternate between different social
worlds and translate between them.54  The translator will have to have at least interactional
expertise in both areas.
Thesis 4: A necessary but not sufficient condition of translation is the achievement of
interactional expertise in each of the fields between which translation is to be accomplished.
If the translator has one or more bodies of contributory expertise, so much the better, but
contributory expertise is not a necessary condition for translation.  Returning to thesis 3, it
seems important that those who represent one group to another group must be able to
translate.
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If the ability to translate consists of more than having multiple interactional
expertises, what is the extra bit?  Presumably it has to do with the skills of the journalist, the
teacher, the novelist, the playwright, and so forth, skills notoriously hard to explain as
qualitative sociologists know to their cost.55
Discrimination
Social actors can sometimes make judgements between knowledge-claims based on
something other than their scientific knowledge.  Judgements of this sort can be made on
the basis of actors' social knowledge: does the author of a view come from within the right
social networks and has he or she the appropriate experience to make their claim credible?
Such things as the personal demeanour of the expert might be the crucial inputs to these
judgements rather as one might judge a politician.  The questions are: Does the author of a
claim seem to have integrity?  Is the author of a claim known to have made unreliable claims
in the past?56  There are also secondary features of a claim itself that can be judged with only
minimal scientific understanding: Is a claim internally consistent or inconsistent, or
consistent with other claims made by the same person?  Does the claim seem so self-serving
as to give concern?
To make the notion of discrimination do any work it is once more necessary to
distinguish between specialists and the population as a whole.  Most members of a society,
just by being members of that society, are able to discriminate between what counts as
science and what counts as non-science.  This is the ubiquitous judgement on which we rely
when we dismiss astrology and the like as potential contributors to the scientific element in
technical decision-making.  Most members of our society have sufficient judgement to know
that the social and cognitive networks of, say, astrologers do not overlap with the social and
cognitive networks of scientists with (Turner's) `Type I' expertise.57  This kind of
discriminatory ability comes with participatory expertise in the matter of living in society!
To see how this works, consider cold fusion.  Most reasonably literate members of
this society `know' that cold-fusion has been tried and found wanting; though there was a
time when cold fusion was contiguous with science as we know it, its cognitive and social
networks no longer overlap.  This knowledge has nothing to do with scientific competence.
On the contrary, it is vital to ignore scientific credentials.  Thus Martin Fleischman, the co-
founder of the cold fusion field, is immensely well-qualified and has both interactional and
contributory expertise in cold fusion yet still believes in it.  What people in Western
populations have in common is what they have heard about cold fusion in the broadcast
media.  Their consensual view emerges from making of social judgements about who ought
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to be agreed with, not scientific judgements about what ought to be believed.  The crucial
judgement is to `know' when the mainstream community of scientists has reached a level of
social consensus that, for all practical purposes, cannot be gainsaid in spite of the determined
opposition of a group of experienced scientists who know far more about the science than
the person making the judgement.  This ability is gained through membership of what The
Guardian newspaper calls the `chattering classes.'  Note that this is not the sort of judgement
we would expect even an immaculately qualified scientist from `another planet' where the
Guardian does not circulate, to be able to make.58  What the members of the chattering
classes have is what we might call `discrimination.'
But contrast this with the more locally informed kind of discrimination of the
Cumbrian sheep farmers.  The farmers had contributory expertise about the ecology of their
farmland but they could also do a special kind of discrimination.  The dispute was between
the local community and the Sellafield authorities but extensive dealings had already taken
place between the parties over the years; as a result, the interaction was tense.  Through
experience, the farmers had developed discrimination in respect of the pronouncements of
the Sellafield authorities in particular: they found the authorities more questionable then they
otherwise would, and more questionable than they would seem to an outsider with less
experience of this particular social and geographical location.  (In the Appendix we will
discuss another case described by Wynne where there is ambivalence between local and
ubiquitous discrimination.)
The lack of expertise of the wider scientific community
As we have mentioned, one big mistake that has been made in the past is to exaggerate the
importance of the referred expertise of the wider community of scientists.  At the very
outset, when we discussed Wave One, we noted that in the 1950s scientists were often
attributed with authority to speak on subjects outside their narrow area of specialisation.
The Second Wave has shown how dangerous it is to take this kind of referred expertise at
face value since the pronouncements of the wider scientific community are nearly always
based on simplified and retrospectively constructed accounts of the scientific process.  Quite
simply, scientists' supposed referred expertise about fields of science distant from their own
is nearly always based on mythologies about science rather than science itself.  That is why
we have stressed the continuity between the wider scientific community and the public in all
but specialist areas and represented this point in the Wave Three diagram within Figure 7.
Organisations such as COPUS in its first incarnation and many self-appointed scientific
spokespersons, by making science as a whole the focus of their campaigns, have oversold it;
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it is the work of specialists, not generalists -- not the whole scientific community -- that
should be the focus of campaigns to raise the status of science.  Of course, the former type
of campaign treats science as a world view -- competing with religion and the like --  and
therefore is accompanied with the thrill of zealotry, or what might be called `scientific
fundamentalism;' the latter type of campaign would be a comparatively mundane enterprise,
stressing experience and professionalism rather than priestly virtues.
Examining Wave Three more closely, as it is represented in Figure 7, the same point
can be seen from a different angle, as it were.  What differentiates core-scientists from their
fellow scientists on the other side of the vertical line in the top part of the diagram?  It is not
credentials!  The core comprises those who have actually done relevant experiments or who
have developed or worked with theories relevant to the issue in question.
To express this in more general terms, the core-scientists' special position, apart from
their possession of specialist equipment, arises from their long experience and integration
into the specialist social group of which such expertise is the collective property.  Core-set
members do not possess extra formal qualifications and they have not undergone special
periods of formal training over and above what they needed to qualify as certified scientists
in the first place.  It is not more certification that qualifies them for membership of the core.
In terms of formal criteria they are indistinguishable from the rest of the scientific
community; the difference between the core-set and the others is informal.59  This
informality -- the fact that membership of the most esoteric groups is based on experience --
gives us licence to dissolve the boundary between the certified experts and experience-based
experts; in sum, the demarcation lines run vertically in Wave Three (Figure 7) because they
demarcate the set of all experts, certified or uncertified, with relevant experience from those
without it; in Wave One (Figure 7) they run horizontally, demarcating all of those with
scientific qualifications from those without them.60
To sum up, in the vertically partitioned world of Wave Three, the right to contribute
technically to a technical decision is to be assessed by examining expertise.  The appropriate
balance of contributory expertise, interactional expertise, and referred expertise has still to be
worked out and so has the role of discrimination and translation.  In this world, certification
as a scientist has little or no importance.  The role of expertise and the role of democratic
rights are separate.
32
CASE STUDIES
Increasing Interaction: Cumbrian Sheep and AIDS treatment in San Francisco
Let us now see how this categorisation of expertise helps us understand some of the well-
known case studies.  We start by discussing the Cumbrian sheep farmers once more.  The
sheep farmers had contributory expertise that was complementary to that of the ministry
scientists.  They developed it through their long collective experience in the ecology of the
fells and the sheep that live on them.  They failed to make much impact with this expertise
because they lacked interactional expertise; they needed help, either from generous-minded
ministry scientists or from intermediaries with interactional expertise and the ability to
translate.  The sheep farmers also had a special level of local discrimination in respect of the
Sellafield scientists; this had developed out of long experience.
Thus, what Wynne's study shows is not what it has often been taken to show -- that
scientific expertise is to be found among the public -- but that in this particular case there
were not one but two sets of specialists, each with something to contribute.  The sheep
farmers were a small group in possession of a body of knowledge as esoteric as that of any
group of qualified scientists.  The sheep farmers were not `lay' anything -- they were not
people who were not experts -- they were experts who were not certified as such.  To repeat,
in Wynne's study can be seen the working out of the interactions, not of experts and the
public, but of two groups of experts.
Now, it is also true that the sheep farmers had some rights in the matter in virtue of
their ownership of the sheep -- but this can be distinguished from the matter of their
technical expertise with a thought experiment.  Imagine that just prior to the Chernobyl
explosion a group of London financiers had got together to buy the Cumbrian farms as their
private weekend resort, employing the farmers as managers so as to preserve the existing
ecology: the financiers would then be the owners of the sheep not the farmers, yet all the
expertise would remain with the farmers.  `Overnight,' much in the way of stakeholder rights
would have been transferred from the farmers to the financiers, yet this would not make
them members of the core-set; it remains, however, that the farmers should have been
included in the core-set.  Thus, it is easy to see the difference between political rights and
expertise.
To clarify the point further, Figure 9 sets out some indicators or the difference
between the political and the technical contributions to technical decision-making; the first
two rows in the figure have already been discussed, the second two rows are newly
introduced:
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      PHASE
    Political     Technical
Politics Extrinsic Intrinsic
NATURE Rights Stakeholder Meritocratic
OF Representation By Survey ByAction
Delegation By proxy Impossible
Figure 9: Political and Technical Contributions
The first row in the figure tells us that the way politics enters the two `phases' of the
decision-making process is different.61  In the political phase the politics is readily visible and
it treated as an extrinsic feature of the scientific decision.  But, as in the Edinburgh
phrenology case, politics enters the technical phase intrinsically -- it is amalgamated into the
science in such a way that its effect is usually hidden unless picked out in studies such as
Shapin's.
The second row repeats what we have just said: contributions to technical decision-
making are made by right by stakeholders in the political phase (the landowners), but by
merit in the technical phase (the experienced farmers and the scientists).
The third row points out that the contribution of stakeholders could be represented
by something like an opinion survey or a vote, whereas technical contributions have to
respond continually to unanticipated developments in the live science and technology so that
the expertise has to be carried in the person of the contributor.
The fourth row is a corollary of the last point, that stakeholders could appoint a
proxy (e.g. a solicitor), to represent their interests whereas no proxy can exercise skills on
someone else's behalf.
Returning to events post-Chernobyl, it is not clear whether the Cumbrian sheep
farmers' advice ever actually entered the core of the post-Chernobyl discussion but we can
be unabashedly prescriptive and say that it should have become part of it.
We have argued that one of the reasons that the sheep farmers made less impact
than they might have done was their lack of interactional expertise.  The AIDS-treatment
controversy in the San Francisco gay community is an example where the non-certified
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experts succeeded in gaining an entree to the scientific core.62  But they did not manage this
until they gained interactional expertise -- that is, until after they learned the language of the
relevant science.  Their case is represented in Figure 6.  The dashed nexus between the
pocket of experience-based expertise and the core is where the AIDS activists might have
made their contribution, but they did not make it until later -- as represented by the solid
nexus.63  One outcome of our analysis, we hope, will be to encourage the movement of such
a nexus to the left -- i.e. to encourage the involvement of experience-based experts earlier in
the game -- possibly by encouraging such groups to look for spokespersons with
interactional expertise in the science in question or to encourage the growth of intermediary
groups to speak for the scientific knowledge of the uncertified, not as campaigners, nor as
experts themselves, but as translators.  There is, of course, a certain naivety about this
suggestion, but unless all hope of unbiased action is to be abandoned (and why, then, are we
academics?), it is our duty to be naive from time to time.64
Decreasing Interaction: Crashing fuel flasks and airplanes
One of the characteristics of the analyses of the relationship between experts and the public
under Wave Two is that they all push in the same direction: increased participation by the
public to solve the Problem of Legitimacy.  One cannot but feel a little uncomfortable when
every treatment has the same political recipe because it makes it all too easy to imagine that
the prime motivation is political rather than analytical.  A reassuring feature of the Wave
Three approach, which puts expertise at the centre of the analysis, is that there are cases
which push in the opposite direction: there are cases where, according to our analysis,
participation by the public should have been decreased because their expertise was
insufficient to make a contribution.
On July 17th, 1984, in Leicestershire, England, the British Central Electricity
Generating Board (CEGB) decided to demonstrate the safety of their method of
transporting, by train, spent nuclear fuel around the country.  They crashed a train travelling
at high speed into a nuclear fuel flask.  On 1st December 1984, at Edwards Air Force Base,
California, NASA and the FAA deliberately crashed a remotely controlled Boeing 720,
carrying 75 dummy passengers and a full load of  `Anti-Misting Kerosene' (AMK) into the
ground; AMK, as opposed to ordinary jet-fuel, was supposed to reduce the likelihood of the
catastrophic life-taking fires that usually follow otherwise survivable airplane crashes.
In both of these cases the public was brought into the heart of the scientific process
by being given grand-stand seats at the demonstrations, some directly, by being at the scene,
and many more indirectly, through what they saw on television.65  What the public saw was
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that the flask did survive the spectacular crash with its integrity unscathed, whereas the
airplane was almost completely destroyed by fire.
In the case of the flask, the audience was invited by the late Sir Walter Marshall, then
Chairman of the CEGB, to draw the conclusion that the flasks were a safe means of
transport.  He said on television: 'If they're not convinced by this they won't be convinced
by anything.'  The conclusion of the audience watching the airplane crash, bolstered by
headlines in all the newspapers, was that AMK was a failure.  And yet these TV audiences
were in no position to make such judgements -- they did not have the necessary expertise.
In these cases, giving the impression that the public could judge the meaning of the tests was
misleading and seemed designed to serve political ends.66
Thus, according to other experts the train crash could not be taken to imply the
safety of the method of transport because of certain special features of the test whose
significance was evident only to the expert eye.  These included the absence of the railway
lines beyond the point of impact and the removal of the wheels of the wagon on which the
flask was placed: the lines could have penetrated the flask had they been there and the
wheels could have dug into the ground, enhancing the impact.67
Likewise, the plane crash could not be taken to imply the non-safety of AMK
according to the experts because the crash was more severe than was intended (a steel pylon
entered one of the engines), the fire was in any case much less severe than it appeared and
some passengers could have escaped it, and there was much unburned fuel left in and
around the aircraft which helped to cool the flames in the first instance.
Including inexpert members of the public within the groups judging the meaning of
these two crashes meant that debate was cut off prematurely before the appropriate expert
analysis, of the kind we have sketched in the last two paragraphs, had time to make a mark;
the public who witnessed the events simply did not have the contributory, or even
interactional, expertise to make sensible judgements (though they seemed to have enough
`discrimination' to find Sir Walter Marshall's account unconvincing).  In these cases then, the
irony is strong: the environmental lobby, who are usually in favour of widening public
participation in decision-making, would have preferred the interpretation to be the opposite
of the immediate one.  In these cases a better interpretation would have been accomplished
by narrowing the group of decision-makers to certified experts alone.68  This group, of
course, would not have been limited to the `official' experts and would have included
representatives of environmental and safety-conscious lobbies, but they would have had to
be expert representatives.69
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Understanding Interaction: The magicians and Benveniste
It might be thought that the prospect of bringing non-certified experts into scientists' core-
sets and core-groups is near to zero even if the idea makes sense.  It might be argued that the
professional pride of the scientific community would always prevent a change in this
direction, just as it did in the case of the Cumbrian fells.  It might be said that the San
Francisco gay community, even though they were allowed to enter the core discussions, were
allowed to do so only after they had adopted the personae and perhaps the persuasions of
the scientists.70
Fortunately, another kind of case shows us that when the circumstances are
appropriate, professionalism is not a barrier to the inclusion of experience-based experts into
the very heart of scientific decision-making.  Thus, in the case of cold-fusion, there was a
veritable feeding-frenzy of rejection by members of the scientific community who were not
core-set members -- suddenly there were experts everywhere.  In the case of still more
heterodox ideas, such as parapsychology, or Jacques Benveniste's claims about the power of
zero-solutions (homeopathy works through the molecular 'memory' of water), stage
magicians were brought in to pronounce on the propriety of the science and their work was
admired to such an extent that one of them was even given a prestigious McArthur 'genius'
award.
There are two ways of looking at the stage-magician phenomenon: One would be to
account for it as an aberration from proper science that needs to be explained in terms of
political expediency.  Thus, one might see it as a quick and dirty way for scientists to
accomplish rejection of 'fringe phenomena', with the maximum publicity, and without
having to do the messy, difficult, and immensely time-consuming work of trying to prove a
'null' (there are no paranormal effects; plain water never has special biological properties).  In
other words, it is a way for core scientists to get their rejections straight into the public arena
without going through the ordinary core-set process.  If that is what is happening it is hard
to remain neutral in the face of the process; we find ourselves wanting to be prescriptive and
say that this is 'wrong' -- it is a dereliction of scientific duty.71  After all, among other things,
scientists are there to help us know whether there are paranormal effects or homeopathic
effects but their input should be based on their best scientific efforts; ex-cathedra
statements, or dirty tricks, are of no special value, nor should scientists pass their
responsibility to outside groups.  We noted above that scientific expertise cannot be
transferred to a proxy and the business of electing stage-magicians as science's
representatives has to be questioned in this light.
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Represented in the language of Figure 6, this case would reveal a strong and wide
nexus from core-set to specialist pocket.  A too-ready passing over of responsibility could be
represented by a nexus so wide that the whole core-set would flow down it, like water down
a drain, leaving the entire decision to the uncertified specialists.  Revealing too ready a
willingness to abandon responsibility as scientists -- the moral guardians of a certain way of
understanding the world -- is, for obvious reasons, a dangerous game for scientists to play.
Another way of analysing the stage-magician phenomenon, however, and this is how
scientists tend to explain it, is precisely in terms of pockets of specialist expertise.  Under this
interpretation, in employing stage magicians, scientists are reaching toward specialist but
experience-based expertise that has particular application in cases where fraud is suspected.
Looked at this way it seems less like an abandonment of scientific responsibility and more
like a very reasonable extension of the core-set into a social group who may be formally
unqualified and 'uncertificated' but still have many of the qualities of core-set members in
terms of long and relevant experience.72
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
So far we have only differentiated between types of expertise, we have not differentiated
between types of science.  Wave Three, however, needs a categorisation of sciences as well
as a categorisation of expertise.  This is because the appropriate way to integrate the public
into policy processes depends on the nature of the science and technology.  In some cases,
the public seem to be an integral part of the knowledge-base that is needed to make policy
decisions, in other cases, their potential to contribute is much less clear.  Let us start with the
most well-worked-out case, that of technologies for wide-scale or mass public use.
Integral public expertise in public use technologies: cars, bicycles, personal
computers ...'
Consider technologies, such as cars, bicycles, computers, and computer programs, where the
end user is a large proportion of the public whose preferences are taken into account in the
very design process.  In these sciences specialist uncertified expertise is integral to the
development of the technology.
There are at least two kinds of experience-based expertise relevant to such cases.
First there is the narrow specialist expertise of the computer 'buff' and the like.  Indeed,
companies now take advantage of this kind of expertise by nurturing 'lead users' among their
customers.  In effect, these users acquire contributory expertise and this is then recognised
by the companies who then consult them as experts.73  Social groups such as computer
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hackers are similarly expert, although their intervention is not so welcome, at least, not by
the computer companies.
Secondly there is the much broader category of those whose legitimate contribution
to the 'closure' of a technological design grows out of the very fact that they, being the users
(or active non-users) of the object, are integral to the establishment of its meaning and
success.  In effect, these groups have some form of contributory expertise that shapes the
future design, form and function of the artefact.  This kind of argument has been most
forcefully put within what has become known as 'the new sociology of technology'.74  Were
this case to be shown as a version of Figure 6 it would show that the `pocket' of specialists
in the top, technical, half of the diagram, would exhaust nearly all the space outside the core.
Even in the case of a technology like this, however, there is still a political
dimension.  For example, in the case of cars, both drivers and non-drivers have a political
say in the design of cars based on their political preferences -- often preferring designs which
minimise fuel consumption and tax regimes which discourage pollution.  These preferences,
pressures and rights are better represented as belonging in the bottom half of the diagram,
though in this case there is a serious borderline problem -- the rights of the public as public,
and the public as car-drivers, are very hard to untangle.  In spite of the severe borderline
problem in this kind of case, it is important, here as elsewhere, not to generalise from such
extremes to science and technology as a whole.
Integral public expertise in local interest technologies: planning
In planning processes, 'local' knowledge often seems to confer special expertise to certain
social groups.  Like the car users discussed in the previous paragraph, the users of a locality
seem to merit special involvement with the technical experts in the planning process.  Local
people can be seen as a large pocket of experience-based expertise when the issue within the
core is local planning.  Thinking critically about expertise helps to distentangle the force of
this localness, however.
In planning, local knowledge is a kind of expertise because local people can be said
to have long experience of the local environment.  But this expertise has to be used carefully
because local experience, when it is not combined with other kinds of experience, is partial,
and this will frame contributions in a particular way.  Thus, in the case of mineral extraction
or waste disposal, the local population will tend to have a disproportionate understanding of
the disadvantages of any development:  They will know exactly how such developments will
harm the local environment.  But they may not have any special knowledge, or even any
knowledge at all, of how developments will advantage the population of the larger regions
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within which the locality is embedded -- the county, the nation, and so forth -- and the users
of the product.  It is likely to be planning specialists who understand these things.
So far we have said nothing about local political interests, only local expertise.  And
one can see that local expertise is likely to favour the locality even before the politics enters
the equation.  It is tempting to say that any attempt to separate the expertise and the politics
is doomed to failure.  In practice, this may be so, but the two phases are still easy to separate
analytically.  Thus, in the case of mineral extraction and waste disposal, local expertise will
almost certainly militate against location of new plants in the local area as such plants are
almost certain to damage the local environment.  The political interests are more ambivalent,
however, and likely to split along class lines.  Thus, the building of a new quarry is likely to
have an adverse affect on property prices in the locality but a positive effect on employment,
wages, and the profits of small shops.  So the expertise and the political interests of the
higher social classes are likely to be congruent while the expertise and political interests of
the those who work for a weekly wage are likely to pull in opposite directions.  Thus, even in
local decision-making it is still possible and useful to separate the political considerations
from the technical considerations.75
Esoteric and Controversial Sciences
In public use technologies and planning the involvement of the public as experts is `integral'
to the science itself.  Now let us return to sciences where this is not so.  At a first approach,
four kinds of science of this type can be distinguished.  To these we will apply the labels
`normal science,' `Golem science,' `historical science,' and `reflexive historical science.'
In normal science there are no major disputes and the science is as settled as it ever
can be.  In these cases, scientists can fill the role of consultants without problem unless
matters are opened up again by exposure to a controversy, such as in a courtroom or larger
dispute.  In courtrooms and the like even the most routinised procedures with the longest
historical entrenchment can be the subject of heated and detailed analysis.  But this ground
has been thoroughly studied by others so we will not cover it again here.76
Golem science is science which has the potential to become normal science but has
not yet reached closure to the satisfaction of the core-set.  The exposure of the public to
Golem science is represented in our Figure 5.  For example, in the GMO debate the
argument about whether rats' stomach linings are affected by certain kinds of genetically
modified potatoes is science of this kind; in the BSE debate, the question of the strength of
the causal link between BSE and Creutzfeld-Jacob disease is science of this kind.  In neither
of these cases is there any reason to think that the core-set will not reach a consensus
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eventually, nor is there any reason to want to say that the decision they reach should be
influenced by anyone who does not work in a specialist scientific laboratory or medical
school.  It seems wrong to argue that the outcomes of these decisions should be the
prerogative of the political sphere, indeed much of the complaint from the public is that the
science has been prematurely passed to politicians who tried to impose a closure to the
debates that would reassure the public about the safety of the new technologies when no
closure had been reached by the scientists.77
This, of course, is not to say that the decision about what should be done now about
GMOs and BSE can or should be left to certified specialists alone.  There are two reasons:
Firstly, they do not have the answers and, secondly, they may not have been given questions
that correspond with public concerns.  For example, their view of what is acceptable in
terms of ethics, or risk, may not match the view of the public.  Thus, in the case of Golem
sciences it can be seen that the balance of the two spheres of decision-making separated by
the horizontal line -- the technical and public -- is bound to favour of the public as
compared to normal science.  It should be expected, however, that as time -- and it may be
many decades -- passes, the balance would slowly shift back again as a core consensus is
reached.
Historical sciences, on the other hand, are those in which it is not to be expected that
there will be any closure in the core-set debate in the foreseeable future.  Such sciences have
also been understood for a long time even though new developments in science and
technology have brought them much more to the fore in recent decades.  Historical sciences
deal with unique historical trends rather than repeatable laboratory tests.78  The question of
global warming is a historical question; long-term weather forecasting is a historical science;
the ecological effects, as opposed to the effects on single organisms, of GMOs is a historical
problem.  The reason closure on these matters should not be expected in the foreseeable
future is that the whole system in which they are embedded is too complicated to model
accurately, and may even be impossible to predict accurately because of the working of
chaotic processes.
In reflexive historical sciences, the potential for uncertainty becomes even greater as
the long term outcomes are affected by the actions of humans themselves.  For example, the
science of global warming as well as being historical, as just explained, is also reflexive.  This
means their input variables will include the outcome of political and ethical debates among
humans.79
When an environmental decision has to be made, Golem and historical science are in
some ways similar and in some ways different.  They are similar in as far as the scientific
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input is equally uncertain, but they are different in that the certainty which Golem science
can eventually reach through normal scientific processes, cannot be attained in historical
sciences.  In reflexive historical sciences it cannot be approached without social or cultural
regulation.  Thus, in the case of all historical sciences, society needs certified and experience-
based expertise in the scientific fields belonging to the problem as well as political input,
while in reflexive historical sciences politics, policy, regulation and sociology enter in the top
half of the diagram -- expertise in the sciences of politics, policy and so forth are needed as
well as political input in the more ordinary sense.80
In the case of historical science, the role of political and social interests is, perhaps,
especially prominent as there is no hope of any major increase in scientific input so the
institutions that are designed to meld the expert and the inexpert would have more
permanence than they would in the case of Golem science.  In the case of reflexive historical
science, futures must be based not just on permanent social institutions for the regulation of
science but on the development and maintenance of new social institutions for the
regulation of social life.  In this way, these historical policy sciences are more like the public
technologies discussed earlier as they rely on the participation of the lay public (or at least a
large portion of it) for their success.81  It can be seen, then, that, even when the science is
esoteric and controversial, thinking critically about the nature of expertise makes it possible
to understand how and when different types of decision-making processes are needed.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that though science studies has made an enormous contribution to our
understanding of the relationship between science and society, there is more to do.  Wave
Two of science studies has shown us the many ways in which science cannot solve technical
problems in the public domain.  In particular, the speed of political decision-making is faster
than the speed of scientific consensus formation.  As a result of this emphasis, Wave Two's
predominant motif has been the need to legitimate technical decisions -- to solve the
Problem of Legitimacy.  Decisions will have no legitimacy if they continue to follow the
intellectually unsupportable, top-down, authoritarian model of Wave One.  Nevertheless it
would be disastrous to solve the Problem of Legitimacy by dissolving the distinction
between expertise and democracy.  To do this would be to create a new Problem of
Extension.  We argue that expertise should feed into the decision-making process but not in
the old Wave One way; solving the Problem of Extension without re-erecting the Problem
of Legitimacy depends on recognising and using new kinds of expertise emerging from non-
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professional sources.  We argue that to do this we need a Third Wave of science studies,
with the ability to develop a normative theory of expertise.  Wave Two has been enormously
successful, and continues to be enormously successful, in deconstructing knowledge; without
abandoning Wave Two we now need to reconstruct knowledge and develop Studies of
Expertise and Experience -- SEE.
We use a series of diagrams to explicate the way science studies has contributed to
our understanding of the science-society relationship and how it might do so in the future.
The diagrams indicate that decision-making rights that emerge from the political sphere and
those that grow out of expertise should not to be confounded.  We resurrect the old
distinction between the political sphere and the sphere of expertise, but in our model the
boundary is found in a new place.  This boundary is no longer between the class of
professional accredited experts and the rest, it is between groups of specialists and the rest.
This follows from distinctions that scientists make themselves: in any specialism it is easy to
distinguish between a core group of experts and scientists in general, yet the core holds no
special professional qualifications.  We find that to make these classifications work well we
have to distinguish between esoteric sciences, on the one hand, and public technologies such
as cars and computers, on the other.
We go on to indicate first, that it is possible to have a normative theory of expertise
without abandoning the insights or the programme of Wave Two.  We begin to show that
the components of such a theory might include.  We show that we can classify scientific
expertise into interactive expertise and contributory expertise.  We show that these ideas
emerge from sociologists' own practice and this offer one persuasive way into a normative
theory.  We develop some thesis-like propositions using this classification of expertise.  We
also introduce the ideas of referred expertise, translation and discrimination.  In discussing
discrimination we distinguish between ubiquitous and specialist knowledge that has been
gathered as a result of local experience.  Using these ideas we argue that scientists as a class
have no special contribution to make to technical decision-making in the public domain and
that if there are to be public defences of science, they should concentrate on scientists as
specialists rather than generalists.
We briefly reanalyse a series of case studies to show how our new categories work.
In particular we show that Wynne's well-known study of the Cumbrian sheep farmers should
not be understood as a defence of `lay expertise' but as the interaction of two communities
of experts, one without certificates.  We argue that institutions are needed that can translate
the knowledge of such pockets of experience-based expertise so as to make it less easy for
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certified scientists to resist.  Such bodies of experts already exist but tend to be associated
with campaigning organisations.
We redescribe the success of the AIDS activists studied by Epstein using our new
term `interactional expertise.'  We redescribe Collins's study of crash demonstrations,
showing that our theory sometimes leads to the conclusion that there should be less public
involvement in technical decision-making.  That our theory sometimes indicates more and
sometimes less public participation seems to us a strength as compared with the monotony
(in the mathematical sense), of other theories that look at the same area of concern.  We
show that scientists' use of stage magicians to settle certain disputes reveals that in some
circumstances professional scientists are happy to absorb pockets of uncertified expertise.
To finish we argue that this kind of analysis has a dimension that relates to types of
science.  We distinguish normal science, Golem science, historical science, and reflexive
historical science each of which have different implications for our futures.
What we have tried to do is provide a language and some concepts for debating
these issues.  Each different case of public domain science will need its own combination of
expertise.  The sheep farmers were a particularly clear case of the failure to utilise a pocket of
experience-based expertise, but the same analysis will not always apply.
The romantic and reckless extension of expertise has many well-know dangers -- the
public can be wrong.82  To give some examples, when scientific advisers concluded that the
battery additive AD-X2, launched in the mid-1940s, had no significant effect, there was an
intense lobbying campaign, supported by both industrial and individual users.  This
campaign eventually led to the Director of the National Bureau of Standards, Dr.  Allen
Austin, being fired.  He was subsequently reinstated following protests from the scientific
community and the battery additive was finally withdrawn from sale in the mid-1960s.83
More recently, Greenpeace, probably feeding on public acclaim for its actions, blocked the
disposal of the `Brent Spar' oil platform, only to have to admit later that its scientific
assessment was incorrect.84  Similarly, citizen groups, who campaigned in support of Laetrile,
a purported cure for cancer that was labelled a hoax by the FDA, seem to have been
fooled.85  More controversially, citizen groups in the US continue to lobby for creationist
science to be taught in schools while, at the time of writing, in the UK vaccination levels for
measles are falling as a result of an alleged link between the triple measles, mumps and
rubella (MMR) vaccine and childhood autism which seems to find virtually no support
among the scientific community.  These observations merely indicate the kind of work and
analysis that has to be done before `the public' as a whole is attributed with expertise.
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The job, as we have indicated, is to start to think about how different kinds of
expertise should be combined to make decisions in different kinds of science and in
different kinds of cultural enterprise.  The job is to contribute to the debate by deploying the
science studies community's specialist contributory expertise in the matter of the nature of
knowledge and expertise.  To do this is to embark on SEE and to act as knowledge
scientists.  One obvious next step is to find ways to think about how to weight contributory
expertise, interactive expertise, and referred expertise, along with translation and
discrimination, when judgements about a variety of public domain technologies are made.
This has the feel of a classic problem and we would guess that better scholars than ourselves
will discover that the distinction and its consequences has already been discussed in the
Greek city state,86 in the post-1945 debate about the relationship between politicians, civil
servants, industrialists, managers, scientists and other producers of culture,87 and where critic
and artist have confronted each other.
Though this is in many ways a programmatic paper, it is meant to do real work in
changing the way we look upon the enterprise of science studies and the way it handles
questions to do with the relationship between science and society.  We argue a case, but also
show how the work of building a corresponding structure, theoretical, empirical, and
institutional, could be carried forward.  This is a pressing problem if we are to navigate our
way between the Scylla of public disillusion and the Charybdis of technical paralysis.
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APPENDIX
The paper draws on a range of existing empirical and theoretical work.  This appendix
discusses some of this background but makes no claim to be exhaustive.  Instead the aim of
the Appendix is to show how our analysis shares certain concerns already present in STS
though we reformulate the old problems and approach from a different starting point.  As
noted in the main text, the structure of the Appendix mirrors that of the main paper and the
main subject headings in the main paper reappear here, though items of literature are often
relevant to more than one heading so the arrangement under headings is to some extent
arbitrary.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF EXTENSION
We are not the first to have noticed that there is a problem with the way in which science
interacts with the wider society.  For example, in 1977, Lawless discussed 45 cases of
controversial science in the US that occured between 1948 and 1973, and listed many
more.88  In the UK the BSE crisis, documented in the Phillips Report, and public opposition
to GM ingredients in food are two well-known examples.89  Recent policy documents such
as the `Science and Society' report produced by the House of Lords Science and Technology
Committee, the European Union White Paper on Governance and the Loka Institute's
citizen panels set up to consider 'telecommunications and democracy' and 'genetically
engineered foods' all show that it is widely recognised that there is a problem to which some
response is needed.90
Almost invariably, the call has been for greater dialogue between science and the
public and for increased participation in decision-making about science and technology.  For
example the Report of the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee
recommended:
That direct dialogue with the public should move from being an optional add-on to
science-based policy-making and to the activities of research organisations and
learned institutions, and should become a normal and integral part of the process.91
Studies have shown that suspicion within the wider society does not manifest itself in respect
of every area of science and technology.  For example, mobile phones, replacement hip
joints and microwave ovens are not perceived as problematic by the public.  In 2000, a
review of science communication and public attitudes to science in Britain showed that:
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84 per cent of people think that scientists and engineers make a valuable
contribution to society, and three quarters think that science and engineering are
good careers, and that science, engineering and technology will provide more
opportunities for the next generation.92
In the US, surveys that address the topic of science and technology in general, as opposed to
its specific applications in various fields, also show a broad support for science and
technology.  For example, the most recent edition of the NSF's Science and Engineering
Indicators reports that 'In general, Americans express highly favorable attitudes toward
science and technology'.93  Perhaps surprisingly a recent `Eurobarometer' survey dealing
with European attitudes to biotechnology found that, even in cases where scepticism might
be expected to be very strong, respondents were still more likely to agree than disagree with
the statement that technologies such as telecommunications, information technology, space
exploration and biotechnology, will improve life over the next 20 years.94  This support was
not uniform, however, suggesting that where the public do have concerns about science and
technology it seems to be about specific aspects or applications.  Thus genetic engineering
scores lower than communications and information technology -- but nuclear energy alone
was more distrusted than trusted.
In the same way, suspicion does not extend to all scientists.  Although not enjoying
the same level of public support as some professions, opinion poll evidence for the UK
routinely shows that scientists are amongst the most trusted sources of information in the
public domain.  For example, a MORI poll, 'Trust in Scientists,' conducted in March 2001
for the British Medical Association, found that 65% of the sample would 'generally trust
scientists to tell the truth'.95  The result has to be put into perspective in that 89% of doctors
were trusted in spite of the well publicised cases in which doctors have been seen to be less
than honest in their dealings with patients.96  Teachers were trusted by 86% of the
population, professors, judges and the clergy by 78%, and television news readers by 75%.97
All these, then, were trusted more than scientists.  On the other hand, scientists were trusted
more than Civil Servants (43%), trade union officials (39%), business leaders (27%),
government ministers (20%), journalists (18%) and politicians generally (17%).98
Similar sentiments can also be found in the Advisory Report on the Regulation of
Biotechnology, in which the section summarising the findings of the consultation with the
People's Panel, notes that:
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Government advisory groups are a trusted mechanism for decision making, but
membership should be broadly based.  Scientists and healthcare professionals are
seen as particularly important contributors to decision-making.  There is a
widespread demand for as much information as possible and again Government
Advisory Groups, scientists, healthcare professionals and consumer and
environmental groups would be trusted to provide this information.  But the media,
retailers and industry were not trusted.99
In formulating our definition of the problem, therefore, it is specific episodes of science in
context that we use to illustrate our our arguments.
One indication of where things might be going wrong can also be found in the same
survey data.  It turns out that the trust in scientists expressed by these members of the public
is sensitive to the wording of the questionnaire, and falls substantially when the scientist is
associated with government or industry.  What seems to happen is that the distrust of the
scientist's organisation outweighs the more positive evaluation of science in general, leading
to an outcome that is not dissimilar to that for government or industry in general.100  As a
result, a scientist working for the government or industry is seen as much less trustworthy
than one without this affiliation.  This is what Wynne has referred to as `scientific body
language.'101
These survey results are backed up by a range of more qualitative studies.  For
example, in 1998, Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Amos  published the results of a series of
focus groups discussions on the public perception of, and reaction to, the new genetics.
They found that genetic science was frequently interpreted in the context of a wider
understanding of the nature of scientific work, noting that discussion in the focus groups
included such topics as:
competition and cooperation among scientists; sources for funding, especially the
relationship between the new genetics, pharmaceutial companies, and government;
and the relationship between geneticists and the media.102
Thus participants in the focus groups did not evaluate science in general, but science in
practice and seemed well aware of the scientists' need for publicity, publications and grant
income.
Similar results have  been obtained in a wide range of other studies, such as those
done at Lancaster University, where the importance of the public perception of scientific
institutions has been repeatedly highlighted.  Perhaps the most remarkable of these, and
48
certainly the most prescient, is the 1996 study that predicted the controversy over GM foods
in the UK a year or two before it actually happened.  In the follow up study (published as
Wising Up103), the same concerns continued to dominate the discussion of GM foods, but
the more positive evaluation of mobile phones highlighs the fact that the concerns being
expressed were not simply anti-science attitudes but responses to specific characteristics of
the GM food industry.  Similar themes have also been identified in a recent article published
in this journal by Yearley, while edited and overview collections of public understanding of
science research, under the auspices of COPUS and by Irwin and Wynne, and Hargreaves
and Ferguson, also contain references to related findings.104  Together these highlight several
of the more robust findings from the public understanding of science research literature.
People are not typically concerned with science in general but with particular concrete
instances and applications.  What is more, in responding to this application of science, they
are often sensitive to the uncertainties surrounding the science itself and do not distinguish
between the science and its sponsor.  Indeed, one of the most frequent and striking
observations of this research, for example, by Irwin, Dale and Smith, is the way the science
effectively 'disappears' from the dispute at a relatively early stage.105
Finally, surveys conducted in Britain, such as that by Evans and Durant, and case
studies such as that by Welsh, have found that, amongst those most critical of specific
applications of science, there can be groups that have considerable scientific knowledge.106
Likewise, a recent survey of American public opinion, focussing on life sciences and stem
cell research, found a similar picture with 30 per cent of college graduates and 24 per cent of
those who considered themselves 'very informed about science' being somewhat or strongly
opposed to research using embryonic stem cells.107  In other words, more knowledge does
not necessarily lead to more support.  In some cases, the expertise of these stakeholder
groups or their representatives will be substantive and will constitute a direct challenge to the
science.
In other cases, stakeholders will question the ability of institutions and regulations to
deliver the standards of performance needed for the scientific advice to be implemented
safely challenging, not the science, but the assumptions on which it is based.  In the BSE
crisis in the UK, regulations concerning the slaughtering and disposal of animals seem not to
be applied and this seems to be the cause of concern.  Other examples from the STS
literature include Wynne's discussion of the ways in which people living around the Sellafield
nuclear plant interpret statements about safety in the context of previous, largely negative,
experiences.  Similar themes can also be found in the focus group discussions concerning air
quality monitoring in Sheffield that are analysed by Yearley.108
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These studies inform much contemporary thinking about the way in which the
public responds to science.  In particular, the studies have been successful in counteracting
the 'deficit' model -- the argument that public opposition to science followed from public
ignorance of science.  It is now acknowledged that what we refer to as `The Problem of
Legitimacy' is much more complex than the deficit model would imply.
Another way to approach the Problem of Legitimacy is from the direction of
theoretical developments in social science.109  Beck, for example, argues that modernity is
undermining its own institutions and that science, in particular, is increasingly the cause of,
and not the solution to, societal problems.110  At the centre of this development is the
recognition that 'invisible' risks, such as those created by radiation, pollution and
environmental change, are making concern about the uncertainty and contingency that
accompany scientific and technical innovation a central feature of contemporary society.
Policy-makers have become pre-occupied with avoiding technologies that may ultimately
create more problems than they solve.  The emergence of ideas such as 'sustainable
development' and the 'precautionary principle', which are central to new policy discourses,
show that the problems exemplified by 'the environment' have crossed traditional
boundaries to become, simultaneously, social, cultural, economic, ethical and scientific
problems.
A second theme, associated with Giddens, that runs through the reflexive
modernisation literature, is the problem of identity that results from the undermining of
traditional institutions.111  The critical element of the risk society literature is that the
decoupling of individuals from traditional institutions and roles has politicised identity and
lifestyle.  In effect, social life becomes an ever-increasing series of individual choices and
responsibilities.  In the case of science, this change is manifested in the increasing
proliferation of expertise and counter-expertise, and hence the need to make choices about
who or what is be trusted in this new context.  More generally, the change is reflected in the
importance of alternative social movements that provide the social spaces within which the
'sub-politics' of individual life are played out and given meaning.  One solution is to find
ways of incorporating these new social movements and political alliances within the
institutions of governance.  We emphasise, however, that this approach begs important
questions: How should this be accomplished?  How much more inclusive should these new
institutions be?  Who should be included and who excluded?  In our terms, this is the
`Problem of Extension.'  The attempt to resolve the Problem of Extension takes us well
beyond the reflexive modernisation literature.
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THREE WAVES OF SCIENCE STUDIES
As work by authors such as Welsh shows, there was opposition to the power of science and
technology even during the high days of Wave One.  This shows how broad is the brush
with which we are painting.112  Nevertheless thinking about Wave One as a coherent body of
thought can be legitimated by referring to writers such as Mannheim, who insisted that
sociological analysis should draw back when it encountered natural science.  Mulkay
summarised the key points in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as follows:
In the first place, the phenomena of the material world and the relationships
between them are seen seen as being invariant (Mannheim 1936, p.116).  Mannheim
regularly refers to the natural world, and to the concepts appropriate to its study, as
being 'timeless and static'.  Valid knowledge about such objctive phenomena he
maintains can be obtained only by detached, impartial observation, by reliance on
sense data and by accurate measurement (Mannheim 1952, p.  4-16; 1936, pp.  168-
9).  Because the empirical relationships of the natural world are unchanging and
universal, the criteria of truth by which knowledge claims are to be judged are also
permanent and uniform (1936, p.  168).  It follows that natural science develops in a
relatively straght line, as errors are eliminated and a growing number of truths
discerned.  In short, scientific knowledge evolves through the gradual accumulation
of permanently valid conclusions about a stable physical world.113
Merton's sociology of science, with its identification of the norms of scientific activity, also
contributes to the understanding of science as different from other kinds of knowledge
generating culture.114
We do not mean to imply that the intellectual arguments that underpinned the first
wave of science studies have disappeared completely.  The old arguments tend to be
promoted by philosophers and, more recently, by scientists concerned to resist what they see
as an attack on science.  The latter tendency is part of what has become know as the
`Science Wars.'115
We feel it unnecessary in this paper to provide extensive references to Wave Two of
science studies except where those studies could be seen to overlap on the project described
in the main paper, in particular in describing the basis of expertise.
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE
Jasanoff's studies are an example of Wave Two work which does overlap with our concerns.
Her researches into regulatory legal proceedings in the US are classic examples of the critical
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insight that the sociological perspective can give.116  Jasanoff argues that the adversarial
nature of the legal proceedings through which US regulatory policies are tested performs a
range of useful functions:
At their most effective, legal proceedings have the capacity not only to bring to light
the divergent technical understandings of experts but also to disclose their
underlying normative and social commitments in ways that permit intelligent
evaluation by lay people.  Controversies about risk are perhaps the domain in which
courts have made the most impressive contribution to the civic culture of American
science and technology.  By insisting on their perogatives in this regard, courts have
repeatedly affirmed that the ultimate power to guide technology policy is vested not
in experts but in the citzenry.'117
In this context, the selection of the witnesses and experts who testify, and their ability to
demonstrate their expertise under cross-examination, is crucial.  Much effort has been put
into developing criteria for the selection of expert witnesses and to instituting various forms
of quality control within the courts.  Recent examples of this process in action are the three
the Supreme Court rulings issued in the 1990s that effectively encouraged judges to take a
more active role in sifting 'expert' testimony, so that juries were only presented with relevant
and reliable expert testimony.  This represented a change from previous practice, when such
evaluations were typically left to the jury.
These and many other aspects of the US system are described in detail in Jasanoff's
publications and we will not attempt to summarise them here.  Instead we concentrate on
the epistemological status of the outcome of this process.  As Jasanoff argues, the decision
to prohibit or permit something combines scientific content with regulatory power.  For
example, in order to reach a decision about whether or not a particular chemical or process
is hazardous the court may have to decide whether the LD50 test is appropriate.  (The LD50
test measures the toxicity of something by establishing the level of exposure at which 50 per
cent of the test animals are killed.)  Likewise the courts can argue about whether results from
laboratory animals can be generalised to humans.  In other words, the regulatory decision
cannot be made without attributing credibility to one set of experts and denying it to the
other.  This implies making a judgement that has traditionally been the preserve of the core-
set scientists alone.  In the main paper, we separate out the different dimensions of this
process.  We say that these decisions fall under the 'political phase' of the decision-making
process, which deals with the societal response to scientific uncertainty.  Decisions about the
content of science fall into the 'technical phase'.  Unlike some of the more recent attempts to
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achieve a scientific consensus, or at least minimise controversy in the political phase, by
restricting participation to 'approved experts', in our model the scientific decision invariably
gets made after the political one.
The legal examples are important because they are one way in which non-scientists
become involved in making scientific decisions.  Again, this focusses concentration, as in our
Problem of Extension,' on the boundary of the decision-making group.  The Cambridge
Experimental Review Board (CERB) of 1976 pushed these boundaries out further than the
courts.  The deliberations of the CERB have been analysed from a rhetorical perspective by
Craig Waddell.118  The CERB gave decision-making powers not to judges but to a citizen
panel that was asked by the city authorities in Cambridge, Massachusetts to make
recommendations about whether, and under what conditions, research using recombinant
DNA techniques would be permitted in the city's universities.119  The Board comprised 12
members selected from the city's population and their job was to weigh the evidence
presented by both proponents and opponents of the research and make appropriate
recommendations.  The outcome of the Panel's deliberations was the research was to be
permitted, under conditions that broadly mirrored national guidelines and the whole process
was widely seen as a success by all who participated in it.120  In the context of our paper, the
important aspect of the CERB study is that, like the studies of courtrooms, it shows that
non-scientists can lend credibility to decisions concerning science and technology.
These are positive arguments for increasing participation and there are also negative
arguments stemming from the failure of more restricted practices.  One set is brought out by
a case study of the regulation of the chemical 2,4,5,T.121  The negative arguments focus on
the neglect of the assumptions that underpin and frame scientific knowledge claims and
highlight the problems that arise when scientific knowledge is generalised uncritically.  One
of the successes of Wave Two was to draw attention to the contingency and uncertainty of
scientific knowledge whilst also highlighting alternative knowledge(s) that  can (or even
ought) to complement or replace it.
The case of the regulation of 2,4,5,T (an organophosphate pesticide used by farm
workers) is a well-known example of this argument.  A Scientific Advisory Committee in the
UK concluded that 2,4,5,T was safe to use, subject to the caveat that appropriate precautions
were taken.  Farm workers, on the other hand, argued that, because the appropriate
precautions could not be taken in the day-to-day settings in which the chemical was actually
used, then it was not safe.  In this case, the embodied experience of the farm workers is
advanced as an alternative, contextual knowledge resource that could (and should) have been
a legitimate input to the decision-making process and to which scientists were largely
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blind.122  Other settings in which similar ideas receive empirical support include the
gendered and culturally specific experiences of science and technology such as have been
discussed by Fox Keller, Longino, Harding and Harraway;123 the participation of AIDS
treatment activists in clinical trials as described by Epstein;124 the capacity of people with
other illnesses or injuries, such as 'miners' lung', CFS, and RSI, to contribute to the medical
understanding and treatment of their condition as researched by Arksey and Bloor;125 the
contribution of community groups to public inquiries and planning processes as discussed
by Rip, Misa, and Schot;126 and the development of multi-discipinary teams and end-user
groups in industry and research as analysed by Gibbons et al.127
One could say that the tendency to dissolve the boundary between those inside and
those outside the community reaches its apogee in `Actor Network Theory,' as first
adumbrated by Latour and Callon.  Here even the boundary between human experts and
non-human contributors to the resolution of conflict is taken away.128
Another contribution to thought about the meaning of `expert' is provided in
another study by Wynne.  He describes the experience of apprentices working the
radioactive materials industry.  He suggests that the apprentices felt they had no need to
contribute to their own safety by trying to understand the science of radioactivity because
they were `intuitively competent sociologists' and `vigilant and active seekers of knowledge
...  tacitly and intuitively, positioning themselves, using their knowledge of their social
relationships and institutions.'129  Wynne argues that the apprentices used their social
understanding as a basis of trust in their employers.  In a later article, referring to the same
group, he says that these apprentices' `technical ignorance was a function of social
intelligence.'130
There are two ways of looking at Wynne's contribution.  It could be an example of
what we have called `local discrimination.'  In this case the apprentices would be seen as
using their hard-won specialist competence in understanding the trustworthiness of their
particular employers and their own place within the social networks of trust operating in that
particular workplace to assess the safety of their procedures to which they exposed.  There
is, however, the danger that this analysis is vulnerable to the same kind of ambiguous
interpretation that we find in the case of the sheep farmers, namely that specialist expertise
that is not recognised with a certificate is confounded with the capabilities of humans in
general in virtue of their `socialness.'131  The danger is, in our terminology, that local
discrimination and more ubiquitous discrimination are being confused.
Thus, let us assume the apprentices also hold bank accounts.  Would Wynne want to
say that they felt no need to understand economics because they were, to use his phrases,
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`intuitively competent sociologists' and `vigilant and active seekers of knowledge ...  tacitly
and intuitively, positioning themselves, using their knowledge of their social relationships
and institutions ...' when they paid their cheques into the bank?  Would he argue that the
apprentices would be using their social understanding as a basis of trust in their bankers and
that their economic ignorance was a function of social intelligence?  The answer is that if he
did say this he would be right but he would be talking of the relations of trust in general that
pertain throughout any smoothly functioning human society rather than a specific locally
aquired discriminatory ability.  Once more, for discrimination to be a useful concept we
must solve the Problem of Extension in respect of those who can discriminate.
We have discussed Turner's paper at length in the text and note here that though he
makes a useful classification of expertise, he does not discuss the levels of competence
within an expertise that licence contribution to a technical decision.  This difference in
emphasis may arise from difference in concerns between the UK and the US.  The STS
literature shows that public participation and opposition often starts with the 'neighbours' of
a technical problem, and in particular those who are directly affected by it or unable to avoid
its (potentially) negative consequences.  As a reading of Petersen makes clear, in the US
these concerns chime with a wider tendency to be sceptical of government and to place a
high value on public involvement as a mechanism for ensuring accountablity.132  For
example, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 actually makes the participation of socially
and economically disadvantaged groups in community development plans into a political
right.  In the 1970s, this idea was extended to include a wider range of science and
technology policy areas.133  Some consequences of these developments can be seen in the
referenda that are a growing feature of the US political landscape, especially in relation to
science and technology issues such as airport expansion, nuclear power etc., the increasing
use public opinion research by administrative agencies and in experimental with deliberative
forums.  The claim is that:
substantial public input ensures a more thorough and open debate on questions of
science and technology policy.  This is especially important in that the public has so
frequently been excluded from decisions on technical questions.  In this context,
extraordinary measures may be required to facilitate effective citizen participation to
counterbalance the current elite domination of technical policy making.134
This quotation encapsulates the tension that motivates our paper.  Although two reasons are
given for participation, only one of them is supported by the STS literature.  The first claim,
and the one that is supported by STS research, is that public participation ensures fuller
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debate, which has the effect of ensuring that more of the available options and assumptions
are questioned and tested, and perhaps more importantly, seen to be tested.  Thus, as Welsh
argues, one important role played by protest groups is to keep doubts alive in the wider
community and maintain this questioning of expert advice.135  The importance attached to
this scepticism has, no doubt, been reinforced by a series to technically based
controversies136 and the observed failure of past expert advice (e.g.  with regard to nuclear
power as a source of safe and abundant source of energy).
The second reason given, which is not supported by STS, is that public participation
redresses elite domination of technical decision-making.  This is presumed to be a good
thing.  But is it?  We think the answer begs a solution to the Problem of Extension.  The
issue can be clarified by asking whether or not the same urge for participation is found in
other policy areas and, if it is not, would it make sense to advocate it in these contexts.  One
of the most striking contrary examples is the case of economic policy where the tendency is
most of the major economies has been to move towards independent central banks,
effectively giving the power to make key monetary policy decisions to an elite group.  In
other words, once the targets have been set, and monitoring mechanisms set up, the
responsibility for meeting these targets resides solely with the central bank and its advisers.
There is not, however, any direct requirement for more public input to these decisions.  In
the UK, interest rate decisions are made by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), whose
members are all economists working mainly in the financial or banking sectors, although
industry voices are also represented.137  In the US there is little obvious pressure to make the
US Federal Reserve replace Alan Greenspan with a more participatory process.138
From a European perspective the equation between public participation and better
decisions is less persuasive and the `elitist' starting point to debates about the extension of
expertise seems unremarkable.  This means that the debate about appropriate sources of
advice has a different tone.  Although participation is encouraged, this is seen as a problem
of efficiency rather than democracy.  Thus, individuals or groups are said to be able to
contribute to a consultation process because they have some relevant experience rather than
in the context of a discourse of rights and accountability.  The most formal implementation
of the European perspective is to be found in the Constructive Technology Assessment
(CTA) approach, described by Rip et al, which seeks to maximise the benefits from the more
informal assessments that are triggered by scientific and technical controversies.139
The CTA approach is explicitly sociological and is closely related to the Second
Wave of science studies.  Within this perspective, the emphasis is on the networked nature
of knowledge, with the robustness of knowledge claims being related to the amount of work
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that one has to do in order to challenge them.  Controversies are useful, therefore, because
they can destabilise existing networks and expose the work that goes into creating new ones.
Social learning occurs as different frames, knowledges, and sources of expertise are
articulated and the network made more or less robust.  This notion of articulation is
important.  It implies that only certain types of contributions will promote social learning
and that, whilst participation should not be restricted to established institutions and actors,
only certain types of contribution are to be welcomed.  Thus Rip argues:
The effectiveness [of extraparliamentry dissent] lies in the attention given to
knowledge claims in addition to negotiations between interests, and in the
broadening of the agenda that occurs by including more parties in the debate.  These
advantages are relevant for public participation in general, but have to be set against
the disadvantage that rules for interaction and the emergence of consolidation
require some boundary.  Introducing a new party in the debate may offset the
balance of forces; this should only be done when a gain in articulation is to be
expected.  Concretely, this implies that participation is not a citizen's right per se, but
has to be earned on the basis of specific claims about the issues in the controversy.140
Characterising the process as one of 'social learning' also has implications for the nature of
the outcomes.  Consensus is not necessarily the goal as the process will have worked if all it
does is raise awareness of questions and uncertainties.  This is particularly important for
many of the scientific controversies that occur in policy debates precisely because the
existence of controversy itself signifies a lack of consensus.  According to the CTA
approach, in such circumstances what is needed is a process that will enable the new
network of knowledge to be developed in a context in which it is unclear who knows what
and what, if anything, needs to be learned.  For this process to develop, there needs to be a
means of identifying potential participants, a processes for orchestrating the interaction
between different parties, and a purpose to motivate their interaction.  Our paper is aimed
mainly at the first of these problems, but we do not deny that the other stages also pose
significant difficulties.
For example, one obvious problem faced by any institution dealing with such
controversies is that the arguments are not just about science and facts, but about interests
and resources.  As a result, the forum created for resolving the conflict can become just
another resource within it, and is thus used strategically by the participants.  Thus, rather
than facilitating a Habermas-type discourse between equals, the participatory forum becomes
another part of the already contested decision-making process.  In this context Rip cites the
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case of the 2,4,5,T debate in the US, where opponents of the use of the herbicide refused to
participate in a second 'dispute resolving conference' because they felt the first such
conference had co-opted them and they did not want to be associated with a similar
outcome.  Similarly, conferences about power in Holland and Austria became so dominated
by pro-nuclear groups that the public they wished to persuade actually stayed away!141
Despite these problems the need for social learning remains and the
acknowledgement that controversy exists, even if it is badly organised, is still a more useful
response than the repression or denial of its legitimacy.  These ideas are reflected in the
discussions at the recent EU workshop, 'Democratising Expertise,' in which it was accepted
that there was a need to involve experts and stakeholders at the earliest possible stage in
technical decision-making processes, and to retain their involvement as decisions need to be
revisited and re-evaluated in the light of new evidence.142  The workshop participants also
acknowledged that the definition of expertise needs to be broad and include theoretical and
practical knowledge from across the range of sciences and stakeholder groups, including the
public at large, whilst also emphasising that 'democratising expertise' is not about majority
voting in science.143  Instead, there is a need to elaborate principles on the way expertise is
developed, used and communicated and to develop mechanisms to make expert advice more
widely available so that representatives can take more informed decisions.144  In other words,
decisions need to be taken by accountable decision makers but the quality and legitimacy of
those decisions is enhanced if they are seen to take the full range of views into account.145
The idea of extending decision-making rights outward from the generally recognised
core-set of certified experts has a resonance with the idea of 'maximum objectivity', which
Sandra Harding defines as follows:
A maximally objective science, natural or social, will be one that includes a self-
conscious and critical examination of the relationship between the social experience
of its creators and the kinds of cognitive structures favored in its inquiry.146
There is, however, a difference between our view and that of the advocates of standpoint
science.  In our case, participation is predicated on experience-based expertise.  In the case
of standpoint science, however, political position in society is itself taken to legitimate an
input to science; there would be a feminist science, a black science, and so forth.147  These
sciences would be discontinuous with each other.  In our model, the contributions of
women or members of ethnic groups to science would be continuous with it.  Women,
blacks and so forth would contribute specific experience-based expertise which could be
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gained no other way except through participation as members of those groups.  They would
contribute their special kinds of expertise wherever such expertise was relevant.  We would
make no claim to legislate in advance for where such expertise was relevant -- that would be
a matter to be settled in each particular case.  But such expertises would almost certainly not
be universally relevant -- there would be no female or ethnic physics, just distinctive
contributions to areas of science by women and certain ethnic groups wherever this was
appropriate.
To us it seems strange that academics, in particular, should want to adhere to the
opposite view to the one expressed above.  The ready acceptance of the idea that science is
politicised through and through rules out the possibility of complaint when we find that
certain scientific and technical arguments are hopelessly biassed by their sources.  For
example, do we never want to say that the tobacco industry has for years falsified the
implications of epidemiological studies out of a concern for selling more cigarettes?  Do we
want to say, rather, that this was just the tobacco industry's point of view and the only fight
there is to be had with them is a political fight, not a scientific fight?  Do we want to say that
the estimates for the success of Patriot in shooting down Scuds during the Gulf War were
not `illegitimately affected' by the interests of the parties, only `affected?'148  Accepting the
arguments for standpoint sciences would imply that such concerns are a category mistake
because science is indistinguishable from politics.  Oddly, the one group of people who
would be most affected in terms of loss of power is academics because their only source of
power is the legitimacy of their arguments, critical or otherwise.
It seems, then, important to retain a notion, even it is an idealised one, of a core-set
community in which expertise is used to adjudicate between competing knowledge-claims
and to determine the content of knowledge.  The wider society still has a role to play in
forming a view about the socially acceptable use of such knowledge and what to do while
such knowledge remains contested but this contribution lies in the political sphere.  Lay
people as lay people, however, have nothing to contribute to the scientific and technical
content of debate.  Even specific sets of lay people, as demarcated by gender or colour, have
a special contribution to make to science and technology only where it can be first shown
that their special experience has a bearing on the scientific and technical matters in dispute.
CASE STUDIES
Cases of common illness also give rise to analyses which confuse expertise among the
general public with the experience-based expertise of a specific group.  For example,
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although Arksey makes much of the expertise of the public in general, the `Repetitive Strain
Injury' (RSI) sufferers who she studied were actually a specialist group.149  As one sufferer
said, and with some justification in our view:
We're the experts: not the doctors, or the consultants, or the physios.  We're the ones
who have to live with it [RSI] Day in day out.  It's us they ought to be asking if they
want to find out about RSI.150
It may not be the case that the RSI victims hold all the keys to their illness, but they surely
hold some of them.  Arksey seems to think that this discovery licences a much more general
positive evaluation of skills among the public.  She uses this to critique what she sees as the
elitism of the suggestion that the general public were not able to evaluate the crash tests seen
on television.  And she is not alone in making such inferences.  In a simlar vein, Locke
argues that books such as The Golem series underestimate the extent to which the public are
able to understand the limitations of technology.151  Turney, echoing Locke's position, agrees
that `...  it is ...  possible to doubt that lay publics are quite as sociologically naive about
scientists and scientific knowledge as Collins and Pinch's approach suggests.'152  Similarly
Wynne says that the public are not `imprisoned by the experts' control of the technical
dimension'.153
Our response, as has already been indicated, is to examine the the specific expertise
involved rather than to make general claims about the developed expertise of the public.  We
find that the two are very often confused.  Thus Locke considers that the public have little
to learn about science from treatments such as are found in The Golem series because they
are already chock full of sociological knowledge about science.  What a strange argument!
There may indeed be pockets of the public that have such knowledge as a result of their
experience, but why think this is true of the public at large in this one area of (highly
disputed) academic study.  Once more the discovery of pockets of expertise seems to be
being romantically extended to the public as a whole.
Perhaps these authors are mistaking the spreading cynicism about science among the
public for sociological expertise.  Distrust is easy; sophisticated evaluation is difficult.  The
hard problem is to make the evaluations sophisticated enough to be able to do more than
just criticise; the public has also to struggle with the very, very, difficult problem of making
positive evaluations if the Problem of Extension is to be resolved for them as well as us.
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TYPES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Our discussion resonates with Funtowicz and Ravetz's term `post-normal science.'154  In
their work post-normal science is the uncertain and controversial science, such as the
sciences of the environment, in which the stakes for decision-makers are very high but the
uncertainties in the knowledge are enormous.  As a result, in these sciences it is impossible
to separate facts from the value commitments, themselves often controversial, that
underpinned their production.  Such a science has only limited epistemological authority,
and therefore, only a weak claim to compel action, so that mananging risks and uncertainty,
which is a political rather than a scientific matter, becomes increasingly important.  This
means there is a need for new, more inclusive, decision-making processes:
Only a dialogue between all sides, in which scientific expertise takes its place at the
table with local and environmental concerns, can achieve creative solutions to such
problems, which can then be implemented and enforced.  Otherwise, either crude
commercial pressures, inept bureaucratic regulations, or counterproductive protests
will dominate, to the eventual detriment of all concerned.155
Although agreeing that there are cases where science alone clearly cannot provide the
answers, we believe that the idea of a 'post-normal science' does not help with the Problem
of Extension.
The trouble is that the concept of 'post-normal' science conflates different themes
from the public understanding of science literature by treating different types of expertise
and knowledge as if they were interchangeable.  These problems are discussed and
investigated empirically by Steven Yearley, who also compares the approach of Funtowicz
and Ravetz with that of Brian Wynne.156
Yearley starts from a similar point to that we have argued -- there are certain robust
findings that have come out of the public understanding of science tradition but that more
general criteria for applying these findings to new contexts remain elusive.  According to
Funtowicz and Ravetz, we need to focus on the 'quality control' procedures that warrant
knowledge claims.  In the case of post-normal science, the proposed resolution is for a
process of extended peer review, where non-scientist groups bring in 'extended' facts that
may be relevant to the matter.  As Yearley points out, there are some problems with this
even as a conceptual system.  For example, when only one of `decision stakes' or `system
uncertainty' are low, the need for extended peer review is less clear (e.g.  cosmology and
major industrial disasters), so that the theory does not always work in practice.  Secondly,
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where any particular issue should be positioned -- i.e.  where the boundaries between normal
science, consultancy and post-normal science lie -- is itself potentially the subject to
controversy so that the identification of post-normal science itself is part of the problem.157
Assuming post-normal science can be identified, the solution proposed by
Funtowicz and Ravetz is that controversy be resolved through reducing either system or
stake uncertainty through further research such that professional consultancy becomes
appropriate.  The problem with such an approach is that the research itself is potentially
contestable and it is not obvious how the membership of this extended peer community
would be established and inclusion/exclusion criteria maintained.  We would argue that the
problem thus lies in the conflation of the technical and political phases of the decision-
making processes.  More research that might ultimately reduce uncertainty could be an
appropriate response, and we would argue that its conduct will be enhanced if it draws on a
wide range of expertise in its conduct, but it is unlikely to resolve the political problems in a
realistic time-frame.  Hence in these cases a separate process, based on different criteria, is
needed to resolve the political need for action in the short-term.  In other words, the
technical and political processes need to be conducted in parallel, with priority in the first
instance going to the political phase.
In arguing this view we are thus much closer to the position of Wynne, who typically
talks about expertise rather than facts (or extended facts).  Wynne's work is based on a
distinction between different types of uncertainty: risk (where odds are known), uncertainty
(where parameters but not odds are known), ignorance (where not even parameters are
known), and indeterminacy (where the way in which systems will be used by others cannot
be guaranteed).  From Wynne's perspective, which is shared amongst much of the CTA
literature, there is the sense that although scientific expertise is partial (in the sense that it
rests on cultural assumptions and norms etc.) its 'gaps' can be 'filled' by others with
complementary expertise in the relevant areas.  These areas might include: local knowledge
about the system (natural or social) in which science is to be applied (sheep farmers,
farmworkers, slaughterhouse employees etc.) and knowledge about the past behaviours of
the institutions involved enable them to make (better) informed judgements about who to
trust and who not to trust (Sellafield inhabitants, people living around chemical factories
etc.).  In this way criteria for inclusion emerge based on participation in particular
social/cultural settings.
The regulatory problem for Wynne is to increase the attention given to what we
don't know (ignorance and indeterminacy), and to find ways of bringing these inside
regulatory programmes (i.e.  to build commitment to precautionary or anticipatory
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regulation), without reducing them (as typically happens) to the category of 'risk'.  It is this
translation, and imposition of particular model of regulation, that is the problem in Wynne's
view, which is sceptical both of public acceptance of experts in the past and of the role
played by expert disagreement now.  Once the translation of scientist's knowledge of the
'social' into pseudo-science is recognised, the power of lay knowledge as a critique of science
is much more powerful than reflexive modernisation as promoted by Beck and Giddens
suggests.
Our view is not dissimilar from this in terms of how we would understand the nature
of knowledge and expertise.  Where we do differ is in our willingness to be prescriptive
about what should follow from this.  In particular, Wynne's categorisation of uncertainty and
knowledge is typically very effective in structuring empirical data.  The problem is how to
turn these observations into an institutional response.  Wynne repeatedly emphasises the
case by case and local nature of knowledge, suggesting no easy algorithm to its identification
and incorporation in regulatory processes.  Yearley, on other hand, is more optimistic
suggesting that focus groups can perform something like the peer review function suggested
by Funtowicz and Ravetz and provide some of the expertise needed to inform the 'broader
debate' that Wynne says is needed.  Our aim has been to go one step further and to articulate
some of the criteria that could be used to institutionalise these responses more effectively.
We have divided what Funtowicz and Ravetz call post-normal science into three
phases.  Once these kinds of science are separated they do not seem to involve any deep
abandonment of the expertise/value distinction, even though they argue for a stronger input
from the bottom half of our diagrams.  Thus, in the case of Golem science the argument
would be that the public has no particular role to play in developing the scientific consensus,
although it may have a legitimate input to policy processes that decide what to do in the
absence of scientific consensus.  Crucially, however, it may still be the case that among the
public there are pockets of expertise that do have a legitimate claim to enter into the core-set
and that these specialist groups should therefore contribute to the developing scientific
consensus in a special way.
63
NOTES
*The provenance of this paper is the theoretical work done at Cardiff University in putting
together an application for an ESRC Research Centre, the `Centre for the Study of
Expertise and Environmental Policy' (SEEP).  This initial work was done in the autumn
of 1999 and the bid was submitted on 20th January 2000.  Here is the opening paragraph
of the submission:
We face a crisis over the way we make decisions about the environment.  We find
ourselves caught on the horns of a dilemma: do we maximise the political legitimacy
of our decisions by referring them to the widest democratic processes, and risk
technical paralysis, or do we base our decisions on the best expert advice and invite
popular opposition?  This is the crisis that SEEP will address.
A little way below we find:
Thus, on the academic side we want to create a new way of talking and thinking
about expertise and experience to replace the old discourse about science and truth.
It can be seen that the framework of the argument presented in this paper was already in
place at this point.  We are grateful to various members of three Cardiff departments -- the
Schools of City and Regional Planning, Journalism and Media Studies, and Social Sciences --
for providing an environment in which the theory could be beaten out.  The paper also
benefited from critical comments by members of audiences at Gothenburg University where
a version was presented by Collins in September 1999 and at Cornell University where a
nearly finished draft was presented in November 2001.  We are also grateful to Ingemar
Bohlin, Martin Kusch, Ari Rip, Steve Yearley, Anne Murcott and members of the Cardiff
KES group for comments on earlier versions.  We also thank the referees of the first
submitted draft for providing us with the opportunity to improve the paper markedly.
                                                
1 The Chambers Dictionary.
2 For an approach which grows out of political philosophy, see Stephen Turner, `What is the Problem With
Experts?', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, 1, (2001), 123-149.  Turner argues that it initially seems hard to
square the notion of liberal democracy with the idea of elite groups of experts whose knowledge takes them
beyond the reach of normal political judgements.  He concludes, however, that a rationale exists for expertise to
function in modern democratic societies.
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3 Many other contemporary social analysts of science and technology have normative commitments but, so far
as we know, none has developed a normative theory of expertise.
4 Among the variations to be found are those expressed by one of our referees who insisted that the discovery
of the negotiability of the boundaries of expertise was in no way connected to the idea that anyone should have
a say in expert decisions.  It seems to us that if there is no defining criterion for expertise it follows that there is
no way of defining people out of the category and this invites unlimited extension.  It also seems to us that
many have read precisely this conclusion into Wave Two.  That the referee did not agree merely shows how
difficult it is to describe a broad sweep in a way that will take everyone's interpretation into account.
5 The term is used liberally in, for example, Hilary Arksey, RSI and the Experts: The Construction of Medical
Knowledge, (London: UCL, 1998).
6 The wider use of the notion of expertise does, of course, do immense work in the debate about artificial
intelligence but precisely because it shows that so much expertise is restricted to humans not machines -- ie it
extends only to the boundary of social beings and no further (H. M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social
Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT press, 1990); H. M. Collins, & M. Kusch, The
Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998).  If the term `lay
expertise' has an application, a better one might be to the kind of expertise that is distributed throughout the
human race.
7 There were questions concerning the `social responsibility' of science but these very problem arose out of
science's power; to raise questions of social responsibility is to ignore questions of the foundation of
knowledge.  That things were not as uniformly simple as our broad brush suggests can be seen in publications
such as Anthony Standen, Science is a Sacred Cow, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1952); Ian Welsh, Mobilizing
Modernity: The Nuclear Moment, (London: Routledge, 2001),
8 Let us bear in mind that being philosophically high and dry does not mean that positivism does not remain
immensely strong in terms of political and economic power as well as being the predominant driving idea in the
tremendously successful natural sciences.
9 We resisted the pun.  Both authors continue, unabashed, with their Wave Two-type studies and so do their
colleagues and students.
10 The quotation marks here indicate where we are quoting the the words of the referees of an earlier draft of
the paper.
11 We understand, of course, that any such contribution is not going to settle the problem `once and for all' (to
quote a critical referee).
12 Opera cit note 6
13 The distinction made here is not to be confused with the similar methodological difference between
investigating the flow of the river of history while standing in the stream -- by studying a contemporaneous
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science -- and by studying it as a historian, after the river has reached its outflow.  This is a distinction of
methodology, not aims.
14 As has been argued in H. M. Collins, & S. Yearley, `Epistemological Chicken', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science
as Practice and Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 301-326
15 As well as opera cit note 12 see T. Pinch, H. M. Collins, & L. Carbone, `Inside Knowledge: Second Order
Measures of Skill', Sociological Review, Vol. 44, (1996), 2, 163-86; H. M. Collins, `Tacit Knowledge, Trust, and
the Q of Sapphire', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, 1, (2001), 71-85; .
16 Op cit note 14.  Let us hasten to add that many Wave Two authors have made valuable `upstream'
contributions and many of these are discussed in the Appendix and in the main body of the paper.  We are
simply trying to describe, systematise, and set on a firmer foundation, the contribution of the sociology of
scientific knowledge to what happens upstream.  To give one example, Evelleen Richards (eg B. Martin, E.
Richards, & P. Scott, `Whose a Captive? Whose a Victim?: Response to Collins's Method Talk', Science
Technology and Human Values, Vol. 16, (1991), 252-5) argued that it was part of the duty of science studies to
give positive advice on the conduct of science and Trevor Pinch (Trevor Pinch, `Generations of SSK. Review
of Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer and Sapp, Where the Truth Lies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, 2,
(1993), 363-73), in reviewing her work, referred to it as `third generation' SSK (though his first and second
generation did not coincide with our First and Second waves).  Richards and Collins disagreed about whether
her work was SSK, and Collins would still say it was not -- it was knowledge science.  This is the kind of
distinction that we are trying to resolve here.
17 H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992) [First edition, Beverley Hills & London: Sage, 1985]; H. M. Collins, `The Meaning of
Data: Open and Closed Evidential Cultures in the Search for Gravitational Waves', American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 104, 2, (1998), 293-337.
18 The size of the core set can be influenced by the 'size' of the claim made — e.g.  the extent to which it seeks
to overturn a small or large part of the conventional theories (Trevor J. Pinch, Confronting Nature: The
Sociology of Solar-Neutrino Detection, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986)) -- and the availability of resources which
limit the ability of scientists to participate in the debate at all (Bruno Latour, Science in Action, (Milton Keynes:
Open University Press, 1987)).
19 Thomas F. Gieryn, `Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, (1983), 781-95;
Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, (Chicago & London: University of
Chicago Press, 1999).
20 These remarks were made by Steven Yearley, who kindly allowed us to identify him as one referee of an
earlier draft of the paper.
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21 And this has been known for a long time by those convinced by the arguments supporting moral relativism;
moral relativism does not lead to moral anarchy, but to the sad acceptance that beyond a certain point moral
judgements cannot be justified but are nevertheless right -- one just has to take responsibility for them.
22 Or it might be that the appropriate circle of judgement for a work of art is still wider than the trained critics
and hence the claim, `I may not know much about art but I know what I like,' is not entirely frivolous.  Indeed,
some art is intended to make a fool of circles of specialist critics or to cause us to reflect on the nature or the
establishment.  But, setting all that aside, should we feel happy with: `I may not know much about science but I
know what I like'?
23 This is not to say that once upon a time the public, or at least those who witnessed experiments, were not
more important to the process of science.  And it is not to say that such rights are being increasingly demanded.
It is this latter process in which we are intervening.
24 In an unpublished paper presented to the 2000 conference on `Demarcation Socialised' held at Cardiff
University, Collins argued that a demarcation criterion between science and art could be found in the
relationship between the intentions of the author of a paper/work and the interpretation of the consumer.  It
was argued that in scientific paper-writing the author's intention must always be to limit interpretative licence
whereas in some forms of art or poetry it might well be to provoke an unanticipated response or interpretation.
Though our main classification -- no special expertise, interactional expertise and contributory
expertise -- was initially chosen because it is already present in the discourse and practice of social scientists,
it has begun to feel less arbitrary as the argument has developed.  The distinction does seem to `pop up all
over the place' once one starts to think about these matters.  In this case, pressed upon us by our referee, it
seems the obvious way to think about the relationship between artists and critics.
25 Steven Shapin, `The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the Edinburgh
Phrenology Disputes', in R. Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected
Knowledge, Sociological Review Monograph, 27, (Keele: Keele University Press, 1979), 139-178.
26 By `Lysenkoism and the like' we mean cases where state power is used to over-rule scientific conclusions that
are subject to broad consensus within the international scientific community.  We note that all but the most and
least radical of scientific commentators decry, for example, the involvement of the tobacco companies in
supporting scientific research aimed at certain conclusions.
27 The degree of `visibility' of the politics is not, by itself, a good criterion of intrinsicness or extrinsicness of the
politics since degree of visibility is contingent on historical events and contexts (we thank Charles Thorpe for
this point).  The criterion of intrinsicness has to be the extent to which scientists, or other commentators,
would willingly endorse the input of politics into the science.  To play the Western science `language game,' and
this whole paper stands and falls on an agreement to play it, means being unwilling to endorse, publicly, an
input of political influence into science.  However irreducable the political input, the politics must remain
intrinsic if it is Western science that is being done.
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As we explain in the Appendix, this means there are two ways to look at modern
`standpoint theories.'  One way is to see the input of new classes of expert, such as
women, as experts on women, as a way of reducing already existing political biasses so as
to increase the integrity of the science.  The other way is to see them as insisting that
science is a product of its polical milieu, that there are different sciences based on
different political viewpoints, and that the influence of the `standpoint' should be explicit
and extrinsic.  As we indicate, to argue in the second way is to abandon the language of
Western science, something which we stand against.
28 But the compartmentalisation is analytically vital.  The difference between SSK's descriptions and its
prescriptions seem to be at the root of certain earlier heated debates.  The prescriptions, as in the case of the
justice system, are a matter of knowing how to act appropriately within a set of institutions or `language game.'
Misunderstanding the difference between the analyst's `is' and the analyst's `ought' has led to some ghastly
confusions.  For example Scott, Richards, and Martin op cit note 16; Collins, H. M., `In Praise of Futile
Gestures: How Scientific is the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, 2, (1996),
229-44.  One might say that Scott, Richards and Martin, having noticed that SSK has shown that politics is
intrinsic to science, believe it should be made extrinsic also.  We disagree.  When one moves upstream into the
area of prescription one must be aware that one no longer has the analytic privileges and advantages accorded
to those who remain downstream.  Likewise, staying downstream is incompatible with overt prescription
because symmetry is central to downstream analysis.
29 This phrase is due to Collins, `Changing Order ...', op cit note 17.  The idea has been modified and extended
by MacKenzie who points out that uncertainty and opposition can increase as science enters the policy-making
sphere (Donald MacKenzie, `The Certainty Trough', in R. Williams, W. Faulkner, & J. Fleck (eds.), Exploring
Expertise: Issues and Perspectives, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998), 325-329; ).
30 We talk here of the cognitive debate.  As Latour (note 18) has argued, there are many factors that make
scientific disputes more or less settled in practice.
31 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962);
Harry Collins, & Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What You Should Know About Science: 2nd Edition with new
afterword, (Cambridge & New York: Canto, 1998) [first edition, Cambridge University Press, 1993].  In the
afterword to the second reference evidence is used to show the relationship between textbook accounts and
other accounts of the foundations of relativity.
32  For example, the UK government's response to possibility of a link between BSE in cattle and CJD in
humans was orchestrated around these ideas and government statements invariably took the line that there was
no risk or that beef was completely safe (Barbara Adam, Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and
Invisible Hazards, (London & New York: Routledge, 1998); Barbara Adam, `The Media Timescapes of BSE
News', in Stuart Allan, Barbara Adam, & Cynthia Carter (eds.), Environmental Risks and the Media, (London &
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New York: Routledge. pp, 2000), 117-129.  The same concern for certainty was also reported in Brian Wynne's
study of the sheep-farmers (Brian Wynne, `May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay
Knowledge Divide', in Scott Lash, B. Szerszynski, & Brian Wynne (eds.), Risk, Environment & Modernity:
Towards a New Ecology, (London: Sage, 1996), 44-83); and, more recently, can be seen in the response to
concerns about the safety of the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine given to young children and in the
possible dangers posed to service men and women, and presumably civilians in war zones, by the use of
Depleted Uranium (DU) ammunition.
33 What is meant is that, like Harold Garfinkel's famous breaching experiments, scientific controversies
highlighted the rules of scientific behaviour and their ambivalances.  Harold Garfinkel, `A Conception of, and
Experiments With, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions', in O. J. Harvey (ed.), Motivation and
Social Interaction, (New York: Ronald Press, 1963), 187-238.
34 See also Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond, `About Misunderstandings About Misunderstandings', Public
Understanding of Science, Vol. 1, 1, (1992), 17-21 [January].
35 See, for example, Gieryn, opera cit note 19.
36 In other words, as indicated above, expertise is being treated in the way it would be treated under `knowledge
science.'
37 We are led to ask this question after, on the advice of a referee, re-reading Turner, op cit note 2.
38 Our claim in respect of astrology is not that it has never been used to contribute to decision-making at a
variety of levels, but that very few of its proponents confuse it with science any more than they would confuse
the sayings of an oracle with science.
39 Part of our job could be described as helping to realise such continuities in expertise as continuities in social
and cognitive networks.
40 Wave Two studies show that many of the arguments used by scientists to exclude some whole field or other
from scientific consideration are based on risible or disingenuous oversimplifications of the way their own
sciences work, but this is not make the other fields valid. (H. M. Collins, & T. J. Pinch, `The Construction of
the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening', in R. Wallis (ed.), Sociological Review Monograph. No. 27:
On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, (Keele: Keele University Press,
1979), 237-70)
The stress on the orthogonal nature of decisions about fields and decisions about
expertise within fields and the subsequent setting out of Figure 8 emerged from the
discussion at Cornell University mentioned in the acknowledgements.
41 For a discussion of expertise and experience see Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical
Way in the Scientific Revolution, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995)
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42 To anticipate a potential question, what we will call `interactional competence' in an expertise can be a Type I
interactional competence even though it is not itself a full-blown Type I expertise.
43 There is terminological difficulty here.  Turner classifies expertise rather than competence within an
expertise.  We want to talk about competence within an expertise.  Unfortunately the possession of certain
expertise is also seen as a sign of competence as when we say that certain humans are more competent at sports
than others if they possess more sports expertise.  We don't think the terminological untidiness causes any great
problems however as the meaning should always be clear from the context.
44 For example into tacit and explicit knowledge, with two different more detailed classifications within these
broad categories (Eg Collins opera cits notes 12 and 15.  With another author he has also divided human
abilities into `polimorphic' and `mimeomorphic' (Collins and Kusch, op cit note 12).
Probably the most currently well-known classification of expertise is that due to
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (Hubert L. Dreyfus, & Stuart E. Dreyfus, Mind Over
Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer,
(New York: Free Press, 1986)) but the Dreyfus model is not appropriate for answering
the kinds of question we pose here.
45 Researchers in the sociology of scientific knowledge have long understood how difficult it is to employ
research assistants precisely because the skills needed to do the research are not the generic skills of the broadly
trained social scientist but must include interactional skills in the substantive topic of the field study.  Here our
starting point in the esoteric sciences is felicitous.  Sociologists who do not study the esoteric sciences may not
be so familiar with these distinctions, and may find them less immediately persuasive, but these distinctions are
useful ones nevertheless.
As was pointed out at Cornell University, this classification is very broad and it may
be that more refined classifications are needed.  Nevertheless, this classification is all that
is necessary to `hammer in a piton.'
46 Collins experienced complete failure in his attempts to acquire interactional expertise in the field of the
theory of amorphous semiconductors.
47 Collins acquired enough competence to make significant published contributions to the field of the
investigation of paranormal metal bending (B. R. Pamplin, & H. M. Collins, `Spoon Bending: An Experimental
Approach', Nature, Vol. 257, (1975), 8 [4 September]).
Of course, an identical defence could be made of the nature of science, and is made
in the tu quoque argument.  That is to say, in our work, we act as though there is such a
thing as science.  But this presents no problem so long as our relativism is of the
methodological kind.  Likewise, there is nothing in this argument to prevent analyses
based on methodological relativism in respect of expertise.  We are just demonstrating
another way to go about things.
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48 Brian Wynne, `Sheep farming after Chernobyl: A case study in communicating scientific information',
Environmental Magazine, Vol. 31, 2, (1989), 33-39; Wynne, op cit note 32; Alan Irwin, & Brian Wynne, (eds.)
Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, (Cambridge, New York &
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
49 Here we do not discuss the power relationships and protection of vested interests.  Through our discussions
we merely want to use academic argument to lessen the impact of these interests in future incidents of this sort
by lessening their legitimacy.
50 None of this is to claim that making established scientists listen will be easy.  For the AIDS case see Steven
Epstein, `The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of Credibility in the Reform of
Clinical Trials', Science Technology & Human Values, Vol. 20, (1995), 408-37.  There is a wider question about
the extent to which the treatment activists represented the whole gay community, let alone the still more
heterogenous group of people suffering from AIDS.
51 We are ignoring, for the purposes of our argument, the very obvious fact that the managers are also likely to
be much better scientists than any visiting sociologist.
52 As well as the technical abilities remarked on in the quotation and the previous note.
53 Though in the case in question, some scientists thought that the referral was from too distant a site.  They
thought that high-energy physics, from where the managers came, gave them a misleading picture of the skills
required to do interferometry.
General Groves, who managed the Manhattan Project, was an interesting case who
would seem to contradict this argument   (Charles. Thorpe, & Steven. Shapin, `Who Was
J. Robert Oppenheimer? Charisma and Complex Organization', Social Studies of Science,
Vol. 30, 4, (2000), 545-590 [August]).  But see also the experience of Frank Muir
discussed in note 87, below.
54 Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology, (Garden City New York: Anchor Books, 1963); Collins and Yearley,
op cit note 11.
55 The problem of translating between self-contained cultures, `paradigms,' or `forms-of-life,' is an old one. (Eg
see H. M. Collins, & T. J. Pinch, Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science,
(Henley-on Thames: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).  In the history of science it has often been alluded to
under the heading of `trading zones' Peter. Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics,
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997).  Skills of journalists are compared with sociologists in Phillip. M.
Strong, `The Rivals: an essay on the sociological trades', in Robert Dingwall, & Philip Lewis (eds.), The
Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others, (London: Macmillan, 1983), 59-77.
56 These judgements are not dissimilar to those made by scientists within the scientific community.  Thus, Lewis
Wolpert has said: `...  scientists must make an assessment of the reliability of experiments.  One of the reasons
for going to meetings is to meet the scientists in one's field so that one can form an opinion of them and judge
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their work.'  (Lewis Wolpert, `Review of `The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science', Public
Understanding of Science, Vol. 3, (1994), 323-337.)  We will go on to discuss the relationship between our
concept and similar issues discussed by Wynne in 1992 and 1993 (Brian Wynne, `Public Understanding of
Science Research: New Horizon or Hall of Mirrors?', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1, 1, (1992), 37-43
[January]; Brian Wynne, `Public Uptake of Science: A Case for Institutional Reflexivity', Public Understanding
of Science, Vol. 2, 4, (1993), 321-337 [October]).  We, however, distinguish between specialist and ubiquitous
expertises.
57 Poor social judgements are the problem with those who believe in, say, newspaper astrology as a scientific
theory.  They are making a social mistake -- they do not know the locations in our society in which trustworthy
expertise in respect of the influence of the stars and planets on our lives is to be found.
58 See H. M. Collins, `Tantalus and the Aliens: Publications, Audiences and the Search for Gravitational Waves',
Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, 2, (1999), 163-197 for a similar argument in respect of the rejection of claims
about the existence of gravitational waves.
59 Increasing the potential for debates about who is in and who is out -- a typical boundary problem.
60 To make the point from the opposite side, so-called `junk scientists,' such as those called as expert witnesses
in court rooms, often have paper credentials but are not counted as experts by their peers.
61 The term `phase' is used here in the materials science sense -- as in a `phase diagram' for a material, rather
than in the time-sequence sense.
62 Epstein, op cit note 50; Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism and the Politics of Knowledge,
(Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1996).
63 In the case of the sheep farmers there was probably never a nexus.
64 If Figure 6 were taken to represent the Cumbrian case, there would be no solid nexus at all between the core-
set and the `pocket.'  The dotted nexus would stay where it is, however -- the sheep farmers should have been
in the core-set from early in the game.
65 For a full account see H. M. Collins, `Public Experiments and Displays of Virtuosity: The Core-Set
Revisited', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 18, (1988), 725-48.
66 This sentence is not as naive as it appears.  Compare what has been said about the Edinburgh phrenology.
We are not trying to suggest any hard and fast distinction between science and politics, nor are we suggesting
that these tests and their interpretations could have been carried out completely `objectively'.  What we are
suggesting is that the way in which the political sphere encroached on the technical sphere in these cases was
clearly illegitimate under almost any analysis of science.  There is no difficulty in making prescriptive statements
about it.
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67 Collins was able to demonstrate the incompetence of audiences of university personnel by showing them film
of the crash and asking them to criticise it without prompting.  They always failed to notice the visible features
that had been pointed out by Greenpeace's experts.
68 This not to say that there are not groups of experience-based experts in different aspects of the safety of the
transport of nuclear fuel in the population as a whole.  For example, there are pockets of experience-based
expertise concerning the degree of radioactivity on sections of rail, and sidings, used for railway transport.  But
these people are experts, and by that fact alone, not ordinary.
69 In the case of the train crash, the experts who pointed out the deficiencies of the test came from Greenpeace;
in the case of the aeroplane crash, the experts (who were represented on a subsequent TV programme), were
from ICI -- the manufacturers of AMK.
70 As Bloor argues (Michael Bloor, `The South Wales Miners Federation, Miners Lung and the Instrumental
Use of Expertise, 1900-50', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 30, 1, (2000), 125-40).
71 There is also the danger that this form of account takes us back to the sociology of error, in which deviant
science is explained in a different way to 'proper' science.
72 The correct analysis varies from case to case but we suspect that the motivation is most often of the first kind
especially as the stage magicians do not and are not expected to adopt the norms of the scientific community
such as honesty and openness.  In either case, the welcoming of magicians into the heartland of science makes
the point about the permeability of professional boundaries.
73 See e.g. Eric Von-Hippel, The Sources of Innovation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).  The role
of these lead users is not entirely unproblematic, however, and, as Phil Agre has argued, can lead to the neglect
of novice users in the design of technology.  The result of this is that inefficient design, particularly of IT
interfaces, become embedded social practices as manufacturers and lead users overlook the increasingly
complex training and restructuring that is needed to make the machines work (see
http://commons.somewhere.com/rre/2000/RRE.notes.and.recommenda19.html)
74  Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change, (Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press, 1995); Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, & Trevor Pinch, The Social Construction of
Technological Systems, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987).
75 Thinking about planning debates brings out two other kinds of ability that belong below the line in the
diagram.  There is the ability of the middle-class protestors and professional lobbyists, who know how to
present an argument and how to penetrate the appropriate networks and there is the skill of the activists who
know how to cause the authorities the maximum inconvenience and expense by climbing trees, burrowing into
tunnels in the ground, and so forth.  We could thus add these types of ability to discriminatory and translation
skills we identified earlier.
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76 See, for example, Michael Lynch, & David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at
the Iran-Contra Hearings, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996);  Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch:
Science Advisors as Policymakers, (London & Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990);  Sheila
Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law Science and Technology in America, (Cambridge, Mass & London: Twentieth
Century Fund and Harvard University Press, 1995); Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual?: The Windscale Inquiry
and Nuclear Decisions In Britain, (Chalfont St. Giles, Bucks: British Soc. Hist. Sci. Monograph, 1982); Roger
Smith & Brian Wynne, (eds.) Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law, (London: Routledge, 1989)
77 As we will explain in the Appendix, Funtowicz and Ravetz misleadingly refer to this kind of situation as
`post-normal' whereas it is simply `pre-normal' (Silvio O. Funtowicz, & Jerome R. Ravetz, `Science in the Post-
Normal Age', Futures, Vol. 25, 7, (1993), 739-55).
78 Karl. R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, (London, Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1957), used the term
`historicist' to refer to teleological theories which assume a progressive historical trend.  We do not discuss
progressiveness, only sciences that deal with long term unique changes.
79  This kind of science has been examined by Barry Barnes in the context of economic decision-making (Barry
Barnes, The Nature of Power, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
80 There is a certain symmetry here; just as the scientific community is the appropriate location for disposing of
political influence as it impinges on the construction of knowledge, so the polity is the appropriate locus for
decisions about the societal response to uncertain knowledge.
81 For example, do household conservation policies increase or decrease the output of greenhouse gases when
one takes into account the environmental cost of collection and processing of recyclable waste? For a
discussion of the role of SSK in urban energy policies see Robert J. Evans, Simon Marvin, & Simon Guy,
`Making a Difference: SSK and Urban Energy Policies', Science Technology and Human Values, Vol. 24, 1,
(1999), 104-130; for economic policy as social technology see Robert Evans, Macroeconomic Forecasting: A
Sociological Appraisal, (London: Routledge, 1999).
82 Apologies to Malcolm Ashmore for this un-ironic use of the word 'wrong'.  (Malcolm Ashmore, `Ending Up
On the Wrong Side', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, 2, (1996), 305-322)
83 See Edward, W. Lawless, Technology and Social Shock, (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1977) [418-425].
84 The Greenpeace version of this story is available on their website at:
http://www.greenpace.org/~comms/toxics/dumping/jun20.html
85 See: J. C. Peterson, & G. E. Markle, `Politics and Science in the Laetrile Controversy', Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 9, 2, (1979), 139-66.
86 Flyvbjerg discusses the Aristotelian concept of `phronesis,' which is a form of practical wisdom in a moral
setting; prudence and wisdom capture some of the flavour (Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why
social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)).
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Unfortunately the concept is somewhat slippery and includes components of both the political and of
experience.  To use the concept with confidence in this discussion one would first need to redescribe natural
science using the term in the light of what we have learned about science over the last decades.  Our paradigm
case -- the post-Chernobyl Cumbrian sheep farmers as discussed by Wynne -- would not seem to benefit from
the introduction of the term.  The point is that the sheep farmers had technical knowledge of sheep ecology,
not prudent understanding of how to act in a situation requiring ethical judgement, which is an essential
element in Flyvbjerg's usage.
87 On artists in the media, see Frank Muir, A Kentish Lad, (Reading Berks.: Corgi Books, 1997).  Muir explains
the mass defection of programme makers from London Weekend Television when the Board of Directors
sacked their talented boss.  He says:
There was no contact at all between the board and the creative side of the company
... Lord Campbell told us that in his experience all management was the same.  "You
unit heads may think that managing talented producers and performers raises special
problems but I have been in sugar all my life and I can assure you that the
management of people in television is precisely the same as the management of sugar
workers." (At pps 324-5)
On scientists, see Turner, op cit note 3 and Guston (David H. Guston, `Evaluating
the First U.S. Consensus Conference: The Impact of the Citizens' Panel on
Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy', Science Technology and Human
Values, Vol. 24, 4, (1999), 451-482) for scientists and government; David H. Guston,
Between Politics and Science: Assuring the Integrity and Productivity of Research,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
88 Lawless, op cit note 83.
89 The Phillips Report was critical of the way in which scientific advice is solicited, interpreted and used.  In
particular, caveats inserted in the original advice were not given sufficient weight, contradictory evidence was
discounted and the initial recommendations were not reviewed often enough.  The full report is available on the
internet at "www.bse.gov.uk".  See also Anne Murcott, `Not Science but PR: GM Food and the Makings of a
Considered Sociology', Sociological Research Online, Vol. 4, (1999), 3 [September]; Anne Murcott, `Public
Beliefs about GM Foods: More on the Makings of a Considered Sociology', Medical Anthropology Quarterly,
Vol. 15, 1, (2001), 1-11 [March];
90 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Science and Society (HMSO: London, 2000); European
Union White Paper on Governance: Broadening and Enriching Public Debate on European Matters, Report of
the Working Group 'Democratising Expertise and Establishing Scientific Reference Systems, available on the
internet at www.cordis.lu/rtd2002/science-society/governance.htm; Loka Institute (www.loka.org)
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'telecommunications and democracy' (April 1997); 'genetically engineered foods' (February 2002).  The Loka
institute website provides links to reports on over 40 consensus conference held in over a dozen countries.
91 House of Lords, op cit.  note 3, paragraph 5.48.  Guidance on how government departments should put
these principles into practice are given in the Office of Science and Technology publication Guidelines 2000:
Scientific Advice and Policy Making, (available on the internet at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ost/aboutost/guidelines.htm at page 8) and in the Code of Conduct for Written
Consultations produced by the Cabinet Office (http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/servicefirst/2000/consult/code/ConsultationCode.htm)
92 Source: Science and the Public: A Review of Science Communication and Public Attitudes to Science in
Britain, (Wellcome Trust and Office of Science and Technology: UK, 2000).
93 NSF Science and Engineering Indicators, 2000.  Quote at page 8-13 of on-line PDF version, available at
http://www.nsf.go/sbe/srs/seind00/start.htm
94 Eurobarometer 52.1: The Europeans and Biotechnology, (EU: Brussels, 2000).  Available via the internet
from http://europa.e.int/comm/dg10/ep/eb.html
95 Perhaps surprisingly the support for scientists was higher amongst younger people defined as those aged been
15 and 24; it was 79 per cent, higher than that for the sample as a whole.
96 Examples include: Dr Harold Shipman, a former GP in Manchester who is currently in prison after being
found guilty of murdering over a dozen of his patients and being implicated in the deaths of many more; the
scandals at the Bristol Children's Hospital where doctors continued to operate despite much higher death rates
and the concerns of their colleagues; and the retention of children's organs by pathology labs without their
parents' knowledge.
97 There are clearly some inconsistencies here.  For example, professors receive a different rating to scientists,
though it is not clear what the distinction is as its possible to be both.  Similarly, news readers score significantly
more highly than journalists, despite the fact that what they read is the product of journalistic endeavour.
98 Michelle Corrado (2001) 'Trust in Scientists', Paper presented at the British Association for the Advancement
of Science, Glasgow.  Also available from MORI website (www.mori.com).
99 The Advisory and Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology: Report form the Governments Review
(HMSO: London, 1999).  Quote at paragraph 36.  Available via the internet from:
http://www.dti.go.uk/ost/rmay99/Bioreport_1.htm
100 The survey data supporting this observation is summarised in MORI, The Role of Scientists in Public
Debate: Full Report (Wellcome Trust and MORI, 2000) available via the internet from
http://www.wellcom.ac.uk/en/1/mismscnesos.html
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communication for the British Association.  The River Path Report: `Now for the Science Bit - Concentrate!,'
was published in 1997 and is available via the internet from http://www.riverpth.com/library/
102 A. Kerr, S. Cuningham-Burley, & A. Amos, `The New Genetics and Health: Mobilizing Lay Expertise',
Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 7, (1998), 41-60 [at page 48].
103 Robin Grove-White, Phillip Macnaghten, & Brian Wynne, Wising Up: The Public and New Technologies,
(Lancaster: Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University, 2000).
104 Steven Yearley, `Computer Models and the Public's Understanding of Science', Social Studies of Science,
Vol. 29, 6, (1999), 845-66; .  COPUS, To Know Science is to Love It? Observations from Public Understanding
of Science Research (London: COPUS and the Royal Society, no date); Irwin and Wynne op cit note 48; Ian
Hargreaves, & Galit Ferguson, Who's Misunderstandng Whom? Bridging the Gap Between the Public, the
Media and Science, (Swindon: ESRC, 2000).
105 Alan Irwin, A. Dale, & D. Smith, `Hell's Kitchen: The Local Understanding of Hazard Issues', in Alan Irwin,
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of Science in Britain', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 4, (1995), 57-74; Ian Welsh, Mobilising Modernity:
The Nuclear Moment, (London: Routledge, 2000).
107 A full report based on this survey is available from: http://www.vcu.ed/lifesciencessurvy/
108 Wynne, op cit note 32; Steven Yearley, 'Making Systematic Sense of Public Discontents with Expert
Knowledge: Two Analytical Approaches and a Case Study', Public Understanding of Science, Vol.  9 (2000),
105-122.
109 As we explain in the main text, Turner op cit note 3, takes the Problem of Legitimacy to be one based in
political philosophy.
110 Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (London: Sage, 1992)
111 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) esp pp.  124—134.
112 For example, Welsh's (op cit note 106) research on the nuclear industry clearly demonstrates that there was
organised opposition to nuclear power from the moment it was first proposed in what we have characterised
Wave 1.
113 Source: Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: George Allan and Unwin,
1979), p.  11.  Cited works are: Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1936); Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).
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114 See for example: Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1973).  See also Michael Mulkay, 'Norms and Ideology in Science', Social Science Information, Vol.  15
(1976), 637-56.  Here Mulkay questions the adequacy of the norms as we move into the period of Wave Two.
115 Paul Gross, & Norman Levitt, Higher Supersition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science,
(Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994); Noretta Koertge, (ed.), A House Built on Sand:
Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); P. Gross, N. Levitt, &
M. W. Lewis, The Flight From Science and Reason, (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1996); Lewis
Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science (London: Faber and Faber, 1992); Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the
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116 Jasanoff opera cit note 76.
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Technology and Human Values, Vol. 23, 4, (1998), 494-516; 1998; Collins and Kusch op cit note 9.
132 J. C. Petersen, (ed.), Citizen Participation in Science Policy.  (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1984).
133 This is not to deny that the relevant agencies may not have embraced these changes as enthusiastically as
they might.  In practice, therefore, although procedural changes have enabled public representatives to
participate in the development of policies, most of the reforms have focussed on making data and information
available.  As a result, they do not fundamentally challenge the existing definitions of who/what is an expert.  In
other words, they remain based on, and do little to challenge, a deficit model in which expertise is a resource
denied to the socially and economically disadvantaged and abundantly available to the powerful.  Participation
therefore depends on redistributing expertise but does not assume that it lies outside the scientific community.
(See Petersen op cit note 132 at p.  26.)
134 Petersen op cit note 132 at pp. 6-7
135 See for example, Welsh op cit note 106.  It is worth noting, however, that the importance attached to this is
perhaps peculiar to the US and that culture's longstanding distrust in its own institutions.  The contrast between
US systems and those employed in France are clearly brought out in Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The
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